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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the United States, city residents are coming to the 
uncomfortable realization that they have no right to local democracy.  In 
just the past few years, state legislatures have blocked local governments 
from enacting all kinds of legislation, including ordinances dealing with 
smoking, hydraulic fracturing, the minimum wage, gun control, nutrition, 
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civil rights, immigration, plastic bags, and more.1  The sheer volume of 
local enactments being “preempted” by state legislation has reached nearly 
epidemic proportions.  One watchdog organization reported that 2015 was 
the most popular year for preemption in American history, with twenty-
nine states considering comprehensive bills to preempt all manner of local 
legislation.2 
Though it is hardly unprecedented for states to preempt local 
regulations, the breadth and ambition of the recent preemption efforts have 
rarely been seen in American history.  These efforts are the result of a 
profound political realignment within many states that is reverberating 
throughout our democratic system, and undermining many assumptions 
about the nature of our democracy.  This Article uses the lens of 
preemption to examine the broader political trends it exemplifies and gauge 
the capacity of our democratic institutions to withstand them.  Part I 
explains that preemption has become more prevalent because cities are now 
overwhelmingly Democratic while state legislatures, dominated by 
representatives of rural areas, are overwhelmingly Republican.  The 
vertical relationship between cities and states is now an outlet for a partisan 
conflict between rural and urban areas.  Part II describes how the nearly 
perfect alignment of geographic divisions with partisan affiliations has 
elevated the stakes of political conflict between cities and states, and raised 
important questions about the future of liberal democracy.  The 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-
BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2017), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20
Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/463Q-45HW] (highlighting 
several areas where states are active in preempting city authority); Shaila Dewan, States Are 
Blocking Local Regulations, Often at Industry’s Behest, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/us/govern-yourselves-state-lawmakers-tell-cities-but-
not-too-much.html [https://perma.cc/7BDU-AY75]; Brian Eason, State to Locals: You Can’t 
Do That. Or That, INDYSTAR (Mar. 6, 2016, 7:02 AM), http://www.indystar.com/story/
news/politics/2016/03/06/state-locals-you-cant-do/80607546 (focusing on preemption in 
Indiana but also touching on national trends) [https://perma.cc/7S5N-Q3YK]; Cora Lewis, 
States Are Barring Cities from Raising the Minimum Wage, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 23, 
2016, 4:37 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/coralewis/states-are-banning-cities-from-raising
-the-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/PAG7-KBPS] (discussing preemption of minimum 
wage laws); Harold Meyerson, Blue Cities, Red States, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0307-meyerson-city-state-divisions-20160307-
story.html [https://perma.cc/E8N6-4L5D] (describing how preemption battles are becoming 
“routine”); Claire Cain Miller, Liberals Turn to Cities to Pass Laws and Spread Ideas, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/upshot/liberals-turn-to-cities-to-
pass-laws-and-spread-ideas.html [https://perma.cc/G55Y-K53L].  The “Preemption Watch” 
website, hosted by Grassroots Change, is a good resource focusing on public health-related 
preemption issues. See Preemption Watch, GRASSROOTS CHANGE, http://grassrootschange.
net/issues/preemption/ [https://perma.cc/3D9V-8DNR]. 
 2. Allie Yee, Growing Southern Cities Are Increasingly Targets of State Pre-emption, 
FACING SOUTH (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.facingsouth.org/2016/04/growing-southern-
cities-are-increasingly-targets-o [https://perma.cc/Y8M5-R935]. 
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“Madisonian” vision of a democratic society characterized by ever-shifting 
coalitions has been threatened as heightened partisanship, geographic 
segregation, and the cultural and economic impacts of globalization have 
hardened the division between urban Democrats and rural Republicans into 
a perhaps permanent zero-sum conflict.  Preemption is one front in this 
conflict, as rural Republicans seek to negate the cultural and economic 
gains they see urban Democrats making at their expense. 
Part III looks to federalism as a possible means of mediating the conflict 
between urban and rural areas.  Federalism has long been a tool for 
accommodating the competing claims of different groups within the 
framework of the nation-state.  Though state constitutions lack the robust 
federal structure of our national Constitution, conferring upon sub-state 
groups few of the rights that the national Constitution grants states, most 
states nevertheless provide some recognition for group rights through a de 
facto sort of intrastate federalism.  The widespread practice of electing 
legislators from single-member geographic districts provides some 
representation for groups at the state level, while municipal home rule 
grants groups some autonomy at the local level.  However, intrastate 
federalism has always been weak because courts are wary of recognizing 
the rights and interests of sub-state groups.  As a result, courts have freely 
allowed states to dilute the influence of political minorities through 
gerrymandering, and to quash local autonomy by preempting local 
legislation despite the supposed protections of home rule.3 The current rash 
of preemption follows directly from the weakness of intrastate federalism.  
Although I conclude that stronger intrastate federalism is necessary in an 
age of deepening urban/rural conflict, I also doubt that we can count on the 
judiciary to save us from this predicament.  Ultimately, it is up to the 
citizenry to decide how much it values local democracy. 
As a case study of the preemption phenomenon and the broader political 
context it embodies, this Article examines one recent preemption effort that 
has drawn substantial media attention and become a matter of national 
controversy—North Carolina’s “bathroom bill.”  The North Carolina 
legislature convened a special session of the state legislature specifically to 
preempt an ordinance enacted by the city of Charlotte, scheduled to go into 
effect within a few days, that would have provided certain anti-
discrimination protections to gays, lesbians, and transgender individuals, 
including the freedom to use the bathroom of one’s identified gender.4  The 
legislature ultimately passed House Bill 2 (“HB2”), a sweeping piece of 
legislation that not only preempted the Charlotte ordinance, but prohibited 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 193-99. 
 4. See Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7,056 (Feb. 22, 2016). 
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all North Carolina municipalities from enacting any law dealing with 
wages and hours, employment discrimination, public accommodations, or 
municipal contracts.5  Under pressure from business interests including the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the state recently repealed part of 
HB2 but left in place the prohibition on local anti-discrimination 
ordinances.6 
The bathroom bill presents an interesting example of the political trends 
examined here.  North Carolina is a state poised between a largely agrarian 
past and an increasingly urban future, and today is evenly balanced 
between Republicans and Democrats.7  As its cities grow and its population 
of left-leaning Democrats expands, however, rural Republicans have 
tightened their grip on the state legislature and increasingly embarked on an 
anti-urban legislative agenda.8  The bathroom bill is one illustration of the 
conflict between an emerging urban Democratic alliance that sees diversity 
as vital to a globally networked future, and an aging rural power structure 
that is fighting tooth and nail to preserve traditional morality and prevent 
the state’s seemingly inevitable urbanization.  As such, North Carolina 
highlights many of the points of political division that will likely dominate 
the near future. 
I.  THE CONTEXT OF THE PREEMPTION BATTLE 
A. Republican States and Democratic Cities 
The driving cause behind the recent preemption trend is a striking 
political phenomenon: cities across the nation are becoming more 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. See 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3. See generally Michael Gordon et al., Understanding 
HB2: North Carolina’s Newest Law Solidifies State’s Role in Defining Discrimination, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/
news/politics-government/article68401147.html [https://perma.cc/L3EL-CWPG]; David A. 
Graham, North Carolina Overturns LGBT-Discrimination Bans, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/north-carolina-lgbt-discrimination-
transgender-bathrooms/475125/ [https://perma.cc/RP2U-Q23B]. 
 6. See Craig Jarvis et al., HB2 Off the Books as Gov. Roy Cooper Signs Compromise 
Into Law, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article141716579.html 
[https://perma.cc/9SKK-RM8Q]. 
 7. See, e.g., ROB CHRISTENSEN, THE PARADOX OF TAR HEEL POLITICS: THE 
PERSONALITIES, ELECTIONS, AND EVENTS THAT SHAPED MODERN NORTH CAROLINA 317 
(2008); TOM EAMON, THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN DEMOCRACY: NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS 
FROM KERR SCOTT TO PAT MCCRORY 325 (2014) (observing that, between 2000 and 2012, 
North Carolina was about as evenly matched as possible between Republicans and 
Democrats). 
 8. See generally Alan Ehrenhalt, Resisting Inevitable Urbanization, GOVERNING (Dec. 
2015), http://www.governing.com/columns/assessments/gov-urbanization-north-carolina.
html [https://perma.cc/K3B3-9KLP] (reporting on the state legislature’s “anti-Charlotte 
vendetta” after 2012 election). 
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Democratic, while state legislatures are becoming more Republican.9  
Twenty-six of the nation’s thirty largest cities have Democratic mayors.10 
Even in solidly Republican states like Texas, major cities such as Dallas, 
Houston, San Antonio, El Paso, and Austin are all led by Democrats.11  
While city voters have been an important Democratic constituency for the 
past century, demographic trends have pushed cities to support the 
Democratic Party more overwhelmingly than ever before.  Immigrants and 
young professionals in the finance and services industries have flocked to 
cities in recent years, causing them to become more populous, younger, 
ethnically diverse, and consequently, more liberal.12  Charlotte, for 
example, has doubled its population in the last twenty-five years and is now 
among the twenty most populous municipalities in the country.13  Young 
professionals, who are drawn to the nation’s largest financial sector outside 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. The emerging political divide between cities and state legislatures is surely not the 
sole cause of the current preemption trend.  Another key factor has been a concerted effort 
by conservative political organizations like the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC) and industry executives to push for uniform statewide legislation in many areas. 
See generally Thomas B. Edsall, The Republican Party’s 50-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/opinion/campaign-stops/the-republi
can-partys-50-state-solution.html [https://perma.cc/2LQT-HJZZ].  However, ALEC’s role in 
preemption is not clearly distinct from the political factors mentioned in the text. See infra 
note 42.  The rise of ALEC and other ideologically motivated political organizations (such 
as the liberal-leaning State Innovation Exchange, formed in opposition to ALEC) are 
themselves part of the same process of political and geographic polarization that has caused 
city and state governments to assume such divergent political profiles. See BILL BISHOP, THE 
BIG SORT 221-28 (2008) (discussing ALEC in context of increasing political polarization).  
It is therefore not surprising that ALEC has also played a key role in trying to ensure that 
Republicans are elected at the state level. See Edsall, supra note 9.  For additional 
commentary on how Republicans have achieved control of many state legislatures, see Gary 
Gerstle, America’s Other Election, DISSENT MAG. (Fall 2016), https://www.dissent
magazine.org/article/americas-other-election [https://perma.cc/8GKY-NFH8]. 
 10. See Meyerson, supra note 1. 
 11. See id.; see also Alan Greenblatt, Beyond North Carolina’s LGBT Battle: States’ 
War on Cities, GOVERNING (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-
states-cities-preemption-laws.html [https://perma.cc/ZN3R-AQ4U]. 
 12. See Louis Jacobson, Why Democratic Governors and Republican Mayors Have 
Become Rare, GOVERNING (July 16, 2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-
political-party-success-president-governor-congress-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/SK8Y-
ZBPV] (noting that cities are becoming younger, more diverse, and more liberal); Campbell 
Robertson & Richard Fausset, Southern Cities Split with States on Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/us/southern-cities-move-past-states-
on-liberal-social-issues.html [https://perma.cc/FP5V-XN2A] (noting that fast-growing cities 
in the south, fueled by banking, insurance, health care, and technology, are becoming more 
liberal). 
 13. See Stephen Wolf, Why North Carolina Is Turning Blue: A Look at the State’s 
Political Geography, DAILY KOS (Sept. 10, 2015, 11:29 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/
story/2015/9/10/1414999/-Why-North-Carolina-is-turning-blue-A-look-at-the-state-s-
political-geography [https://perma.cc/8VWY-56W7]. 
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of New York, have bolstered its growth.14  In addition, the Hispanic 
population of Charlotte has grown by almost fifteen percent since 2010 and 
helped make Mecklenburg County a majority-minority county.15  Thus, the 
city and county have transformed from a Republican stronghold to a 
heavily Democratic region.16 
A similar pattern is evident in North Carolina’s other major urban areas, 
including Greensboro, Fayetteville, and the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 
Research Triangle, which are also experiencing rapid growth fueled by 
immigrants and young professionals.17  Overall, the growing populations 
and the changing demographics and political compositions of these cities 
have remade North Carolina from a predominantly rural, largely white, and 
conservative state to an urbanized, diverse state that is evenly divided 
between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats.18  While North 
Carolina may be an extreme example, a similar pattern is occurring 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. See generally Owen Furuseth et al., Belonging in Charlotte: Multiscalar Differences 
in Local Immigration Politics and Policies, 105 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 1, 1 (2015). 
 15. See id. at 2; Adam Bell, Mecklenburg’s Hispanic Growth Rate Still Booming, New 
Census Records Show, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 25, 2015, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article25453342.html [https://perma.cc/BKY7
-UDVU] (noting that Charlotte experienced 14.8% growth in Hispanic population since 
2010, and in 2012 Mecklenburg county became majority-minority). 
 16. See generally CHARLOTTE, NC: THE GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF A NEW SOUTH CITY 
(William Graves & Heather A. Smith eds., 2010). 
 17. See Charles Prysby, North Carolina: No Longer Federal Red and State Blue?, in 
SECOND VERSE, SAME AS THE FIRST: THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE SOUTH 171, 
174-75 (Scott E. Buchanan & Branwell DuBose Kapeluck eds., 2014) (noting influx of 
Hispanics and younger, more liberal migrants into Research Triangle area and state 
generally); Betina Cutaia Wilkinson, North Carolina Latinos: An Emerging, Influential 
Electorate in the South, in LATINOS AND THE 2012 ELECTION 149, 149 (Gabriel R. Sanchez 
ed., 2015) (noting rapid growth of Hispanic population in Raleigh-Durham); Micah Cohen, 
In North Carolina, Obama’s 2008 Victory Was Ahead of Schedule, N.Y. TIMES: 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 4, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/09/04/in-north-carolina-obamas-2008-victory-was-ahead-of-schedule/ 
[https://perma.cc/5N3P-NYD2] (noting that Hispanic population in the state grew almost 
tenfold from 1990 to 2010, mostly in main urban centers, and North Carolina now has 
eleventh largest Hispanic population of any state). See generally Suzanne Gamboa, From 
Tobacco to Tortillas: Latinos Remake Durham, North Carolina, NBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2014, 
7:37 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hispanic-heritage-month/tobacco-tortillas-
latinos-remake-durham-north-carolina-n203276 [https://perma.cc/68BS-P5ZB] (describing 
the influx of Hispanic immigrants to Durham and how they are refashioning local culture). 
 18. See Christopher A. Cooper & H. Gibbs Knotts, The Bluest Red State in America: 
Exploring North Carolina’s Political Past, Present, and Future, in PRESIDENTIAL SWING 
STATES: WHY ONLY TEN MATTER 111 (Stacy Hunter Hecht & David Schultz eds., 2015); 
Prysby, supra note 17, at 171-84. See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 7; EAMON, supra 
note 7. 
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throughout the south, as cities are becoming younger and more diverse, 
changing the political and demographic profiles of states in the process.19 
Nevertheless, in North Carolina and many other states, Republicans 
dominate at the state level.  Republicans control both houses of the 
legislature in thirty-two states, and have veto-proof majorities in seventeen, 
including North Carolina.  Democrats control both houses in only thirteen 
states, and have veto-proof majorities in just five.20  Many factors have 
contributed to Republican dominance at the state level, but two are of 
particular importance.  First, rural voters have overwhelmingly sided with 
the Republicans.  As recently as the 1990s, half of all rural residents were 
represented by a Democratic congressperson.21  Today, that number is 
under twenty-five percent.22  Unlike any previous era in American history, 
there is now a nearly precise correlation between an area’s population 
density (that is, how urban it is) and its political affiliation.23  Standing 
                                                                                                                                         
 19. See generally Prysby, supra note 17, at 171-84 (anthology of essays describing 
shifting political demographics throughout the south); Ronald Brownstein, The States That 
Will Pick the President: The Sunbelt, ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-states-that-will-pick-the-president-the-sunbelt/431838/ 
[https://perma.cc/GP8R-FGGZ] (noting that white share of population in North Carolina and 
other states is declining due to urban growth, causing a shift in political preferences); Jen 
Kinney, Houston Attitudes Changing on Inequality, Urban Life, NEXT CITY (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/survey-houston-urban-change-immigration-inequality 
[https://perma.cc/DP9F-HVMS] (reporting that Houston is becoming increasingly more 
Democratic and liberal on issues such as immigrants, gay rights, and criminal justice); 
Meyerson, supra note 1 (noting the same); Robertson & Fausset, supra note 12. 
 20. See Stephen Wolf, Republicans Now Dominate State Government, With 32 
Legislatures and 33 Governors, DAILYKOS (Nov. 14, 2016, 9:09 AM), http://www.dailykos.
com/story/2016/11/14/1598918/-Republicans-now-dominate-state-government-with-32-
legislatures-and-33-governors [https://perma.cc/HNQ5-VWE5]; Paul Woolverton, 
Republicans Retain Veto-Proof Control of N.C. Legislature, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Nov. 
9, 2016, 2:16 AM), http://www.fayobserver.com/b91337dc-a63b-11e6-94b0-df0d1417c782.
html [https://perma.cc/CRP9-NKP3]. 
 21. Laura Meckler & Dante Chinni, City vs. Country: How Where We Live Deepens the 
Nation’s Political Divide, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014, 7:45 AM), http://www.wsj.com/artic
les/SB10001424052702303636404579395532755485004 [https://perma.cc/9AEQ-556E]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 204-05; Paul Diller, The Urban Disadvantage in 
National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 292-97 (2016); Richard Florida, 
America’s Class-Divided Electorate, CITYLAB (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/poli
tics/2016/10/trump-clinton-and-the-creative-class/504827 [https://perma.cc/THK2-6TS8] 
(noting correlation between density and party affiliation).  The urban/rural political divide 
appears to elide the important question of suburban voters, who are neither clearly urban nor 
clearly rural, but are perhaps the largest single bloc of the electorate in many states. See 
infra text accompanying notes 77-85.  However, the suburbs too have been drawn into the 
urban/rural political conflict, with more urban inner suburbs siding with Democrats and 
more rural outer suburbs and exurbs tending to vote Republican. See BRIAN MANN, 
WELCOME TO THE HOMELAND: A JOURNEY TO THE RURAL HEART OF AMERICA’S 
CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION 66, 86-88 (2006).  As the text states, there is a nearly precise 
correlation between an area’s degree of urbanness and its predominant political affiliation. 
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alone, the polarization of urban and rural voters would not explain 
Republican dominance at the state level because, in many Republican 
states, urban voters probably outnumber, or at least match, the number of 
rural voters.24  However, rural voters tend to vote at a substantially higher 
rate than urban voters, especially in midterm elections.25 
The second major factor contributing to Republican dominance at the 
state level is the population distribution of voters.  While Democratic 
voters are concentrated in a handful of urban legislative districts, 
Republicans are more diffused among numerous, less dense districts.26  
This disparity is the combined effect of Republican legislatures 
intentionally gerrymandering legislative districts to maximize the number 
of Republican seats and the natural population distribution of the two 
parties’ voters.  Republicans came to power in many states in 2010, just in 
time for a new round of mandatory re-drawing of legislative district lines 
after the 2010 census.27  Although states are required to create legislative 
districts that have equal numbers of people, Democratic voters tend to 
cluster at exceptionally high rates in small urban areas, whereas 
Republicans are more spread out in rural areas.28  This pattern makes it 
fairly easy for Republican legislatures to gerrymander districts to favor 
Republicans by packing huge numbers of Democratic voters into a few 
urban districts and distributing Republican voters somewhat more thinly 
among numerous districts.29 
                                                                                                                                         
 24. See MANN, supra note 23, at 67. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Diller, supra note 23, at 291 (“Republicans win more seats by 55-40%, while 
Democrats win more by 75-20%.”). 
 27. See EAMON, supra note 7, at 328 (discussing Republican gerrymandering in North 
Carolina after 2010 election); Diller, supra note 23, at 326 (“Following the censuses of 2000 
and 2010, many Republican-controlled state legislatures engaged in intense gerrymandering 
of state legislative and House seats.”). 
 28. This pattern has been referred to as “unintentional gerrymandering.” See Jowei Chen 
& Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral 
Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 239 (2013); see also Alec MacGillis, Go Midwest, 
Young Hipster, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/opinion/
campaign-stops/go-midwest-young-hipster.html [https://perma.cc/CRN3-KUHZ].  There is 
some disagreement about the causal role of intentional versus unintentional gerrymandering 
in accounting for Republican legislative gains. Compare MacGillis, supra (attributing gains 
to unintentional gerrymandering), with Stephen Wolf, Gerrymandering Could Cost 
Democrats the House in 2016. Why? Because It Probably Did in 2012, DAILY KOS (Oct. 18, 
2016, 3:17 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/10/18/1583215/-Gerrymandering-
could-cost-Democrats-the-House-in-2016-Why-Because-it-probably-did-in-2012 
[https://perma.cc/M9AJ-CQ3R] (denying claims of “unintentional gerrymandering” and 
asserting that intentional gerrymandering alone cost Democrats twenty-five seats in the 
House of Representatives in 2012). 
 29. See, e.g., Chen & Rodden, supra note 28, at 264. 
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As an illustration, Republicans in North Carolina gained a supermajority 
in both houses of the state legislature during the 2012 presidential election 
despite the fact that Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney won 
the state by only two percent over Barack Obama, the Democratic 
incumbent.30  The discrepancy occurred in large part because Obama had 
overwhelming support in North Carolina’s urban areas, but much less 
support outside of them.31  The concentration of Democratic voters in 
urban areas, and the dispersion of Republican voters in rural areas allowed 
Republican legislators to cram those Democrats into a small number of 
legislative districts, while spreading Republicans out into a far greater 
number of districts.  As a crude indicator, Obama won four state senate 
districts by over eighty percent, all in the urban centers of Charlotte, 
Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro, and another five by over sixty-five 
percent.32  Romney, on the other hand, won no districts with over eighty 
percent, and only four with more than sixty-five.33  In short, a huge 
percentage of the urban Democratic vote is being “wasted” in legislative 
districts where those votes are irrelevant to the outcome, and many fewer 
Republican votes are similarly wasted.34  The result is that, although the 
state’s urban voters are nearing, and may have actually surpassed, half the 
                                                                                                                                         
 30. See Stephen Wolf, A Comprehensive Look at the NC State Legislature Elections and 
the 2014 Landscape Part 1: The Senate, DAILY KOS (July 22, 2013, 3:55 PM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/7/22/1223992/-A-Comprehensive-Look-at-the-NC-
State-Legislature-Elections-and-the-2014-Landscape-Part-1-The-Senate 
[https://perma.cc/2G4C-STWJ]. 
 31. See EAMON, supra note 7, at 295, 317 (noting rural/urban disparity in support for 
Obama in both 2008 and 2012 elections).  Although increasingly rare in today’s era of 
polarized partisan politics, some of the discrepancy is also attributable to “ticket splitting” 
by voters who selected a Democratic presidential candidate and Republican state legislators. 
See id. at 318.  As Charles Prysby notes, North Carolina voters were clearly unhappy with 
the Democrats who had controlled the state government for many years prior to 2010. See 
Prysby, supra note 17, at 184. 
 32. This is a crude indicator because, among other things, voters may split their tickets 
and vote for a presidential candidate from one party and a legislator from a different party, 
although this is becoming increasingly rare in an era of partisan polarization. See Wolf, A 
Comprehensive Look at the NC State Legislature Elections and the 2014 Landscape Part 1: 
The Senate, supra note 30. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Diller, supra note 23, at 336-42.  Legislative districts in North Carolina are so 
precisely drawn to provide secure partisan advantage that a whopping fifty-three legislators 
ran unopposed in North Carolina’s 2016 elections. See Colin Campbell, 53 NC Legislators 
Lack Opponents as Filing Deadline Ends, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 21, 2015, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-
politics/article50935595.html [https://perma.cc/TA7S-4EW8]; see also Alan Greenblatt, 
Uncontested Legislative Races Are Becoming More Common, GOVERNING (June 2016), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-uncontested-legislative-races.html 
[https://perma.cc/4H3G-X3G4] (noting the large number of uncontested races in many 
states). 
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actual electorate, North Carolina’s legislature is dominated by rural rather 
than urban legislators.35 
North Carolina is an exemplar of an emerging national pattern.  
Nationwide, support for Democratic Presidential candidates has been 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the most urban areas since 2008.36  In 
2012, President Obama won only twenty-two percent of the nation’s 
counties, fewer than even Democratic presidential candidate Michael 
Dukakis won in the course of a landslide loss to George H.W. Bush in 
1988.37  Obama won re-election by a healthy margin anyway because he 
garnered an enormous sixty-nine percent of the votes in cities with more 
than 500,000 people.38  Hillary Clinton improved even on that margin in 
2016, winning seventy-one percent of the vote in the largest counties.39  
The problem for the Obama/Clinton coalition is that, while urban areas 
help Democrats attain votes, elections are determined by territory as well as 
votes, and Republicans control far more territory.40  Clinton lost the 
election despite winning the popular vote because she ran up huge leads in 
urban states and lost by slim margins in less urban states.  At the legislative 
level, the concentration of Democratic voters in urban areas has had a 
similar result–Democrats get more votes, but Republicans win the 
elections.  For example, although Obama won Virginia, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in 2012, Republicans took a two-thirds 
advantage in congressional districts in those states because so much of 
                                                                                                                                         
 35. See generally Chris Kardish, How North Carolina Turned So Red So Fast, 
GOVERNING (July 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-north-carolina-
southern-progressivism.html [https://perma.cc/3CBL-77A7] (explaining causes for 
Republican domination in North Carolina after 2010); Wolf, Why North Carolina Is Turning 
Blue: A Look at the State’s Political Geography, supra note 13. 
 36. Ronald Brownstein, Town and Country, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), http://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/town-and-country/432195 [https://perma.cc/4EL2-
7UZ9] (noting that Democratic coalition under Obama is overwhelmingly urban). 
 37. David Wasserman, The GOP’s House Majority Is Safe . . . Right?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 20, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-gops-
house-majority-is-safe-right [https://perma.cc/WS2C-DM3J] (noting that Dukakis won 
twenty-six percent of counties, compared to Obama’s twenty-two percent). 
 38. See Greenblatt, supra note 11. 
 39. See Lazaro Gamio, Urban and Rural American Are Becoming Increasingly 
Polarized, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
politics/2016-election/urban-rural-vote-swing/ [https://perma.cc/9SK9-E7PT]. 
 40. Compare FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012, (2013), http://www.
fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW8D-62CP], and FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008, (2009), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/
fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B7C-3TSP], with FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 96 (1997), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1996/cover.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8BVA-GWWJ], and FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 93 
(1993), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1992/federalelections92.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AFJ-
TTXE]. 
2017]PREEMPTION, FEDERALISM & LOCAL DEMOCRACY 143 
Obama’s support was concentrated in urban areas that were packed into a 
handful of congressional districts.41  State legislative districts in these and 
other states were similarly gerrymandered to favor Republicans because 
Democrats were so heavily clustered in urban areas.  Republican 
domination at the state level is, therefore, largely a consequence of the fact 
that Democrats are overwhelmingly popular in the cities but extremely 
unpopular outside of them.42 
B. Preemption and the Urban/Rural Rivalry 
A consequence of this political phenomenon is the intensification of a 
long-running urban/rural political rivalry.  Historically, urban and rural 
voters have held divergent political preferences.43  Urbanites generally 
have a greater tolerance than rural dwellers do for government regulation 
because aggressive state intervention is often required to coordinate activity 
among large groups of strangers in a densely populated area.  As Edward 
Glaeser explains in Triumph of the City, although aggregating millions of 
people into a small land area dramatically increases public health risks and 
the potential for crime, city leaders can make cities safe through massive 
public investments in clean water supplies and professional police forces.44  
According to Glaeser, the need for a “vigorous public sector to combat 
crime and illness” may explain “why people in New York are so much 
fonder of big government than rural Kansas.”45  People in rural areas tend 
to value individualism and to be more skeptical of government regulation, 
which they often see as reflecting corrupt urban values and benefitting 
urban areas at their expense.46 
                                                                                                                                         
 41. See Jonathan Chait, Who Needs to Win to Win?, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 3, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/republican-party-2013-2/ [https://perma.cc/C6KJ-6S5E]; 
see also Jacobson, supra note 12 (noting that clustering and post-2010 gerrymandering 
created Republican advantage in the House); Wasserman, supra note 37 (noting that the 
House of Representatives has a built-in Republican advantage due to the clustering of urban 
voters and the huge number of wasted votes in urban areas). 
 42. There are other factors besides geographic clustering and gerrymandering that help 
explain the Republican dominance at the state level.  The electorate during midterm 
elections, when many state gubernatorial and state legislative races take place, skews older, 
whiter, and more Republican than the electorate during presidential election years. See 
Jacobson, supra note 12.  Moreover, conservative political organizations like ALEC have 
undertaken a far more concerted effort to win control at the state level than liberal 
organizations. See generally Edsall, supra note 9. 
 43. See Diller, supra note 23, at 290, 295-97. 
 44. See generally EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 93-116 (2011). 
 45. Id. at 116. 
 46. See Peter L. Francia & Jody Baumgartner, Victim or Victor of the ‘Culture War?’ 
How Cultural Issues Affect Support for George W. Bush in Rural America, 26 AM. REV. 
POLITICS 349, 355-62 (2005) (describing connection between rural voters’ religious and 
cultural views and their political affiliations); James G. Gimpel & Kimberly A. Karnes, The 
Rural Side of the Urban-Rural Gap, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 467, 468-70 (2006) (describing 
144 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
In addition, cities have usually been quicker than rural areas to embrace 
racial, religious, ethnic, and lifestyle diversity, because the anonymity and 
impersonality of city life provides a freer environment for the expression of 
various tastes and interests than the stricter moral order of smaller 
communities.  Similarly, constant exposure to immigrants and strangers of 
all backgrounds breeds acceptance of new cultures and new ideas.47  Rural 
areas, by contrast, are less densely populated and more ethnically 
homogenous, and, unlike cities, have been experiencing a sustained period 
of population loss rather than population growth.48  As a result, rural 
residents have tended to adapt more slowly to cultural change and 
diversity, and indeed often pride themselves on being the guardians of 
traditional religion and morality against what they see as a morally 
corrosive urban culture.49 
Today, with Democrats controlling most cities and rural Republicans 
controlling most states, the traditional rivalry between urban and rural areas 
in American politics is now expressed vertically in the relationship between 
the state and its cities.  That is evident in the preemption battles.  Unable to 
get much traction for their policy preferences at the state level, urban 
Democrats are enacting them at the far friendlier city level.  Consistent with 
their embrace of diversity and comfort with government regulation, cities 
have recently adopted a flurry of laws dealing with health and safety, 
workplace relationships, civil rights, climate change, immigration, and 
others.50  But because state legislators are simultaneously becoming more 
                                                                                                                                         
rural values of rugged individualism and skepticism of government). See generally 
KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT (2016) (describing “rural 
consciousness” in Wisconsin that drives political participation, characterized by resentment 
of perceived urban values, antipathy towards government, etc.). 
 47. See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 44, at 129 (noting that anonymity and impersonality 
of large cities facilitates the loosening of moral constraints); Robert E. Park, Human 
Migration and the Marginal Man, 33 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 881, 888 (1928) (In cosmopolitan 
cities, the individual “is not bound as others are by the local properties and conventions.”). 
 48. See Meckler & Chinni, supra note 21 (describing how loss of manufacturing jobs in 
rural areas has led to population exodus and insulation from cultural change). 
 49. See generally CRAMER, supra note 46, at 130-31, 222 (rural voters see themselves as 
having values that are distinct from, and superior to, those of urban voters); MANN, supra 
note 23, at 166-89 (describing how rural dwellers see themselves as champions of an 
embattled traditional moral and religious culture that is threatened by the encroachment of 
urban values).  The past year or so has seen an explosion of interest in rural America and the 
“white working class.”  Two notable recent books include NANCY ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH 
(2016), a historical discussion of the white lower class, and J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY 
(2016), an affecting memoir about life in a rural white working-class family.  For a review 
and political context, see Alec MacGillis & Propublica, The Original Underclass, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/the-original-underclass/
492731/ [https://perma.cc/3C5R-RZV2]. 
 50. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 
BYU L. REV. 177, 179-86, 252-53 (2016); Diller, supra note 23, at 290, 295-97. 
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rural, conservative, and Republican, those local ordinances are increasingly 
answered with preemption.51 
The current political environment is, in a sense, reminiscent of a 
previous era in American history.  One hundred years ago, cities grew 
enormously thanks to an influx of capital and immigrant labor, but state 
legislatures were dominated by rural interests, largely as a result of 
legislative districts that were malapportioned to over-represent rural 
areas.52  Then, as now, these rural-controlled state legislatures were 
displeased by the growth of cities and the threat they appeared to pose to a 
traditional rural culture.  State legislatures snatched power away from cities 
through so-called “ripper” bills53 and attempted to disenfranchise urban 
voters by adopting stringent voting rules such as onerous registration 
requirements, the secret ballot, literacy tests, poll taxes, and the exclusion 
of paupers from the franchise.54 
At the same time, however, state legislative attitudes toward cities 
during the early twentieth century were not uniformly hostile.  State 
legislatures also enacted laws designed to facilitate urban enterprise and 
growth, and the period was marked, as David Barron has noted, by “state 
legislative expansion of the spending, taxing, and regulatory powers of 
local governments,” not solely the restriction of local government power.55  
As Barron further explains, urban reformers in many states pushed for 
Constitutional amendments granting local governments “home rule,” which 
created a sphere of independent legislative activity for municipalities.  
Home rule was designed to prevent state legislatures from either curtailing 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. Since gaining a supermajority of the North Carolina legislature in 2012, Republicans 
preempted dozens of local laws and even changed voting rules in several urban areas to 
make it harder for Democrats to win. See generally Ehrenhalt, supra note 8.  A particularly 
startling example of how preemption epitomizes the rural/urban political divide is gun 
control.  Urban dwellers overwhelmingly support gun control measures, but local gun 
control ordinances are swiftly preempted by state legislatures because rural dwellers 
vigorously oppose all gun control measures. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 
YALE L.J. 82, 98-103 (2013). 
 52. See DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS:  PRIVATE POWER AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 126 (3rd ed. 2002) (explaining that state governments were not responsive to 
urban needs because “districts were drawn up to ensure that rural counties would outvote 
cities in the state legislative chambers,” regardless of population). 
 53. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan 
Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-
Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 805 (1992); Lyle Kossis, Examining the Conflict 
Between Municipal Receivership and Local Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1125-128 
(2012). 
 54. See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 37-53 (2000) (explaining that many voting rights 
innovations adopted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were efforts to 
prevent urban residents, and specifically immigrants, from voting). 
 55. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2286 (2003). 
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local government power through ripper bills or expanding local power.56  
That home rule simultaneously empowered and constrained local 
governments reflected the ambiguous attitude state governments then 
possessed toward cities. 
The ambiguity had several sources.  State legislatures understood that 
cities were the economic engines of their states’ prosperity, and that state 
legislative power could be expanded by acting through local 
governments.57  Furthermore, state governments’ hostility toward cities 
was mitigated by the fact that both major political parties had rural and 
urban constituencies.  This was especially true of the Democratic Party.58  
For over a century, from the end of the Civil War until the 1980s, the 
Democratic Party was an uneasy alliance of urban working-class voters in 
the north and rural populists and anti-desegregationists in the west and the 
“solid south.”59  Though bitterly antagonistic, these urban and rural voters 
were forced into a coalition initially by their shared interest in opposing the 
pro-business stance of the Republican Party, and then subsequently by the 
largesse each enjoyed under the New Deal.60  The coalition began falling 
apart during the 1960s, as the Democratic Party focused its efforts on urban 
voters, while Republicans sought to peel away rural voters disaffected by 
racial and cultural change.61 
Today, many of the factors that caused state legislators to mitigate their 
hostility to cities have vanished.  After a long period of partisan 
realignment, rural residents are now solidly aligned with Republicans and 
urban dwellers with Democrats.62  According to one observer, “never 
before in American history” have states and local governments “had such 
distinct political profiles.”63  Furthermore, as I explain in greater detail 
below, cities and rural areas are no longer as linked economically as they 
were a century ago, so state legislatures have little reason to worry that 
curtailing city power will have deleterious effects on the state’s rural areas 
or its overall economic health.  The dramatic scope of the current 
preemption epidemic is evidence of just how unusual the current political 
environment is. 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. See id. at 2291-2321. 
 57. See id. at 2286. 
 58. See JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 52, at 110-14. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id.; MANN, supra note 23, at 238-59 (arguing that Democrats made a conscious 
decision to abandon their rural base and focus on an urban agenda). 
 62. See Diller, supra note 23, at 292-97. 
 63. See Meyerson, supra note 1. 
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II.  HOW THE DEEPENING RURAL/URBAN CONFLICT THREATENS OUR 
DEMOCRACY 
A. Madisonian Democracy 
The preemption controversy, and the larger urban/rural fissure it 
exemplifies, indicates that today’s partisan politics is an all-out conflict 
between competing social groups, rather than a temporary alignment of 
ephemeral interests.64  If that is true, it has dangerous implications for 
liberal democracy.  James Madison’s Federalist Number 10, often 
considered a keystone of our democratic tradition, famously worried about 
“factions” harming the paramount rights of individuals.65  While 
recognizing the impossibility of eradicating these factions, Madison argued 
that introducing a wide diversity of interest groups into the political realm 
would make factions inherently unstable.  He wrote: 
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and 
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have 
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a 
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to 
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.66 
As Madison saw it, in a large republic comprised of many diverse 
interests, factions would become temporary, shifting coalitions, not 
permanent cleavages among a fixed set of antagonists.67  Expounding on 
Madison’s insight, the political scientist Robert Dahl argued that 
government in a large, diverse polity such as our own is only possible if 
there are multiple cross-cutting lines of political division—“if the same 
persons are sometimes opponents and sometimes allies”68 and today’s 
minority has an expectation of being tomorrow’s majority.69  This notion of 
                                                                                                                                         
 64. Several recent works confirm that political affiliations today are permanent social 
groups. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS 
307 (2016); BISHOP, supra note 9, at 255-67. 
 65. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1106, 
1127 (1980) (discussing how Madison’s concern with factions reflects liberal suspicion of 
groups intermediate between the state and the individual). 
 66. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 67. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 30 (1961) (“[B]ecause 
majorities are likely to be unstable and transitory in a large and pluralistic society, they are 
likely to be politically ineffective; and herein lies the basic protection against the 
exploitation of minorities.”). 
 68. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 279 (4th ed. 1981). 
 69. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 161 (1989); see also Frank I. 
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial 
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 173 (1977) (describing “[t]he 
Madisonian or Dahlian vision of coalitions that form and re-form from issue to issue, of 
legislators exchanging support here for support there in an ever-shifting alignment of 
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shifting coalitions enables everyone to see the long-term benefits of 
cooperation, and prevents politics and trade from devolving into zero-sum 
contests between warring classes.70  Dahl warns that, on the other hand, 
“[i]f all the cleavages occur along the same lines, if the same people hold 
opposing positions in one dispute after another, then the severity of 
conflicts is likely to increase.  The person on the other side is not just an 
opponent; he or she soon becomes an enemy.”71  Where that happens, 
where “the conflict is over two completely incompatible ways of life—then 
any political system is likely to break down.”72 
Dahl argues that our liberal democracy has usually functioned 
reasonably well because, with some exceptions, it has featured numerous 
cross-cutting allegiances that prevent extreme political polarization.73  Our 
modern two-party system, for example, has tended to give our political 
system a remarkable degree of stability by ensuring that political 
differences are channeled through the two major national parties.74  The 
two-party system also, however, provides an important warning.  The 
original purpose of the two-party system was to short-circuit a potentially 
permanent cleavage between the north and south over slavery; both parties 
were to be national entities built on broad ideological platforms that would 
transcend the corrosive sectional conflict then building.75  The system 
worked reasonably well as long as the parties were truly national.  But once 
the parties became identified with specific territories and opposing stances 
on slavery, the country was almost immediately ripped apart.76 
B. The Hardening of Partisan Affiliations 
Ominously, the territorial division of partisan allegiances that once 
proved so perilous for our democracy is happening again today, though the 
sectional conflict is now between urban and rural areas within states, rather 
                                                                                                                                         
interest groups, making plausible an expectation that over the long run everyone would 
enjoy a net balance of political gains in excess of losses . . . .”). 
 70. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 68, at 252 (arguing that 
democracy is more likely to emerge where people see politics and trade as non-zero sum, 
which destabilizes group identities and creates confluence of interest among people). 
 71. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 67, at 279. 
 72. Id. at 277. See also BISHOP, supra note 9, at 232, 297 (discussing some of Dahl’s 
research and its implications for today’s geographically polarized political culture). 
 73. See DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 67, at 284-307. 
 74. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at 
Democracy:  Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2121 (1990). 
 75. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 50-73 (1983) (noting 
that Martin Van Buren believed the modern system of national parties was “the means of 
keeping the slavery issue quiet”). 
 76. See id. 
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than between northern and southern states.  The urban/rural divide now 
precisely corresponds to partisan affiliation.77  It appears, further, that our 
urban and rural antagonists are not simply shifting coalitions but permanent 
rivals in an increasingly zero-sum conflict.  As Dahl worried, instead of 
having multiple cleavages among multiple lines, today the cleavages all run 
along the single line of partisanship.78  In a recent book, Christopher Achen 
and Larry Bartels argue that parties are all-encompassing social groups 
comprised of people who share similar values, not merely collections of 
individuals with shared interests or views.79  Bill Bishop similarly argues 
that today’s partisan divisions represent competing lifestyles with entirely 
distinct—and mutually opposed—cultures, beliefs, interests, politics, and 
geography.  Bishop notes that this partisan identification has become so 
strong that people do not even want to live near those with different 
political affiliations, resulting in what he calls a “big sort” in which 
Democrats and Republicans have self-segregated into communities of the 
like-minded.80 
In the past, when both parties had rural and urban voters, partisanship 
eased the tension between them by uniting them against a common 
enemy—the other party.  Today, however, partisanship exacerbates that 
tension by pitting rural and urban voters against each other.   Psychological 
research has persuasively demonstrated that the mere act of dividing people 
into two groups creates an “us-versus-them” mentality.81  Moreover, the 
increasing partisan divide between urban and rural dwellers in turn causes 
partisans to take a zero-sum attitude towards politics.  As Katherine Cramer 
notes, identification with a social group causes people to seek more 
resources for their own group, and where, as in politics, resources are 
finite, this necessarily becomes a zero-sum game; groups quickly come to 
resent other groups for taking more than their fair share of the resources.82 
                                                                                                                                         
 77. See Greenblatt, supra note 11 (“traditional regional rivalries almost perfectly align 
with partisan divisions”); Seth C. McKee, Rural Voters and the Polarization of American 
Presidential Elections, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 101, 101-06 (Jan 2008); Meckler & Chinni, 
supra note 21 (chronicling the increasing urban/rural political divide). 
 78. See generally McKee, supra note 77, at 104-06. 
 79. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 64, at 307; see also BISHOP, supra note 9, at 255-
267; CRAMER, supra note 46, at 8. 
 80. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 8-9, 22-23, 199 (defining current sort as “post-
materialist” in that people are choosing where to settle based on lifestyle preferences, which 
today closely correlate with political affiliations).  Recent research confirms that the “big 
sort” has continued and may have in fact gotten “bigger.” See Richard Florida, America’s 
‘Big Sort’ Is Only Getting Bigger, CITYLAB (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/
politics/2016/10/the-big-sort-revisited/504830 [https://perma.cc/BEY7-KW63]. 
 81. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 282-86; see also ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 64, at 
220-21; CRAMER, supra note 46, at 8-9. 
 82. See generally CRAMER, supra note 46, at 8-12 (describing how partisanship 
contributes to rural “resentment” towards urban dwellers). 
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This dynamic of mutual resentment is evident in the preemption conflict.  
One of the chief causes of the current preemption trend is the herding of 
voters into gerrymandered legislative districts.  As it turns out, this 
dynamic is itself partially the result of the self-sorting Bishop describes – 
people have sorted themselves into legislative districts in which one party 
predominates.83  Bishop notes that although individuals do not consciously 
move to particular legislative districts, they do migrate towards other 
people who share their lifestyles, which today is overwhelmingly correlated 
with partisan affiliation.  The herding together of people with similar views 
and their isolation from people with opposing views causes existing 
partisan biases to harden and become more pronounced.84  As a result, 
legislators in many districts now answer to an insular and ideologically 
extreme constituency that desires nothing more intently than to notch a 
victory against the competing political culture.  Because Republican 
legislators in states like North Carolina answer almost exclusively to rural 
residents, preempting local legislation that reflects urban values is an easy 
way to score points with rural voters without alienating any political 
supporters.  Likewise, Democratic city officials may enact legislation they 
know will be preempted in order to demonstrate their commitment to 
progressive causes.85 
C. The Zero-Sum Political Economy of Globalization 
In addition to the urban/rural partisan realignment, globalization and the 
aftermath of the Great Recession have also intensified the political divide 
between urban and rural dwellers, and increased the sense that they are 
competing in a zero-sum game in which one class will emerge victorious 
and the other will be defeated.  The rift over globalization, like today’s 
hyper-partisanship, is also reflected in the preemption conflict. 
As an initial matter, globalization has created a huge geographic 
imbalance in economic fortunes as capital investment is increasingly 
directed towards urban centers and away from rural areas.  The global 
economy is largely a service and knowledge based system that places less 
emphasis on manufacturing capacity and a premium on innovation, which 
is disproportionately occurring in places where creative people with diverse 
                                                                                                                                         
 83. See DAVID DALEY, RATF**CKED xxiv-xxv (2016) (arguing that today’s 
gerrymandered districts have less to do with sorting and more to do with the increasingly 
sophisticated technology legislators use to draw district lines). 
 84. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 73-75. 
 85. In states like California where the situation is reversed, Democratic legislatures can 
enact a pro-urban, anti-rural agenda with little fear of reprisal. See generally Victor Davis 
Hanson, How the Widening Urban-Rural Divide Threatens America, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 
2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1101-hanson-rural-urban-
divide-20151101-story.html [https://perma.cc/D9PQ-Q94B]. 
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skills and knowledge are clustered together; that is, urban places.86  Firms 
are located in cities where they can take advantage of the deep and diverse 
labor pool.87  Cities across the world are increasingly connected to each 
other through trade and the sharing of information.88  As jobs and capital 
concentrate in urban centers, they spark demand for both skilled and 
unskilled labor, so workers have flocked to cities as well, which explains 
the population growth of cities such as Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham.89  A 
large number of these workers are immigrants, whose diversity of skills 
and knowledge boost cities’ economic prospects.90  Cities are being 
transformed demographically in the process.91  The flow of capital and 
labor into cities has been facilitated by liberal trade and immigration 
policies that weaken national borders, a signature attribute of 
globalization.92 
As Richard Florida notes, though, if cities like Durham and Charlotte are 
“winners” under globalization because free trade and liberal immigration 
policies benefit them, rural and white working class suburban areas see 
themselves as “losers” under globalization for the same reason.93  As the 
                                                                                                                                         
 86. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 144-55 (describing how dense, diverse cities foster 
innovation); Richard Florida, How the Crash Will Reshape America, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/how-the-crash-will-reshape-
america/307293/ [https://perma.cc/KB5N-KM56]; Richard Florida, The Winners and Losers 
of Economic Clustering, CITYLAB (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/work/2016/
01/creativity-clustering-us-cities/422718/ [https://perma.cc/447R-GS42]. 
 87. See Furuseth et al., supra note 14, at 2-4 (discussing Charlotte’s efforts to become a 
“global city”). 
 88. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, WHO’S YOUR CITY (2008); SASSIA SASKEN, THE 
GLOBAL CITY (1991). 
 89. See, e.g., Heather A. Smith & Warren Graves, Introduction. From Mill Town to 
Financial Capital, in CHARLOTTE, NC: GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF A NEW SOUTH CITY 
(discussing Charlotte’s transformation into a globalizing city) supra note 16, at 1; Furuseth 
et al., supra note 14, at 2-4. 
 90. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial 
Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1077-79 (2007) (citing John M. Quigley, Urban 
Diversity and Economic Growth, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 127, 130-32 (2008)); Tanvi Misra, 
Immigration Is Absolutely an Urban Issue, CITYLAB (June 10, 2016), http://www.citylab.
com/politics/2016/06/immigration-is-absolutely-an-urban-issue/486386/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZZR2-PJ6M]; see also Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, in 
CLASSIC ESSAYS ON THE CULTURE OF CITIES 143, 150 (Richard Sennett ed., 1969) (“[The 
city] has brought together people from the ends of the earth because they are different and 
thus useful to one another, rather than because they are homogenous and like-minded.”). 
 91. See Misra, supra note 90. 
 92. See Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 150-51 (explaining how free trade policies such as 
NAFTA created demand for low-skilled immigrant labor); Yishai Blank, The City and the 
World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 868, 907-10 (2006) (noting that, as cities have become 
significant sites of global economic activity, international economic institutions such as the 
World Bank are advancing policies to decentralize power from nation-states to cities and to 
push cities to adopt policies that encourage efficiency and innovation.). 
 93. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002). 
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new global economy has linked cities together, it has also severed the 
connection between cities and their surrounding rural areas, and those rural 
areas have been left behind economically.94  The globalization of capital 
and the loosening of trade barriers have caused manufacturing jobs to be 
exported overseas while the globalization of labor and the liberal 
immigration policies have led to fears that low-wage immigrant workers 
will undercut wages for American citizens.95  Mechanization of agriculture 
and other technological developments have also led to rural job loss.96  
Being less dense and diverse than cities, rural areas cannot match the 
advantages cities have in the new knowledge-based economy.  This 
disparity has been especially prevalent since the Great Recession.  A recent 
report demonstrates that half of the job growth since 2010 has been 
concentrated in seventy-three counties comprising just a third of the 
nation’s population.97  Not coincidentally, those seventy-three counties are 
all among the country’s densest urban areas (including Mecklenberg and 
Wake counties in North Carolina, which contain Charlotte and Raleigh, 
respectively).  Florida concludes that 
America’s new economy is increasingly uneven not just across classes, 
but across geography, with a few big winners and many more losers.  This 
is a product of the decline of manufacturing and the rise of an increasingly 
concentrated knowledge economy, which is propelled by the clustering of 
knowledge, talent, and innovation.98 
The sense that the global economy is driving a wedge between urban 
and rural areas, turning trade and immigration into zero-sum contests, is 
hardening the political divide between urban and rural areas.  The depth 
of this divide is evident in the preemption conflict.  To the extent they 
see themselves winning from globalization, Democratic cities have 
embraced political moves to encourage in-migration, free trade, and the 
                                                                                                                                         
 94. See Parag Khanna, A New Map for America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/opinion/sunday/a-new-map-for-america.html 
[https://perma.cc/CUH3-F269] (“America is increasingly divided not between red states and 
blue states, but between connected hubs and disconnected backwaters.”). 
 95. See Cohen, supra note 17 (describing decline of manufacturing and tobacco in North 
Carolina and replacement by global banking, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and 
telecommunications industries). 
 96. See Alana Semuels, The Graying of Rural America, CITYLAB (Jun. 2, 2016), 
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/06/the-graying-of-rural-america/485288/ 
[https://perma.cc/9MAQ-TFN8]. 
 97. See Richard Florida, Geographic Inequality Is Swallowing the Recovery, CITYLAB 
(May 23, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/05/there-are-more-losers-than-winne
rs-in-americas-economic-recovery-due-to-geographic-inequality/483989/ 
[https://perma.cc/56XL-WZFU].  Florida also notes increasing inequality in job growth 
between the twenty largest counties nationwide and the rest of the country. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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clustering of creative people.99  Several cities have adopted “living 
wage” ordinances to entice lower-income workers, redeveloped 
waterfronts and derelict industrial sites, and crafted special zoning laws 
and tax incentives to lure artists and creative people.100  Mayors across 
the country came out widely in favor of President Obama’s proposed 
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which they saw as increasing 
cities’ abilities to connect to each other and leverage the global economy 
to their advantage.101  Many cities, including Charlotte, have attempted 
to adopt “sanctuary city” type policies to signal friendliness to 
immigrants (such as the adoption of municipal identification cards, 
requesting or requiring police to refrain from questioning people about 
their immigration status in certain types of stops, and the like).102  
Charlotte’s decision to extend civil rights protections to gay and 
transgender individuals, which ultimately led to North Carolina’s 
“bathroom bill,” can also be viewed as an attempt to enhance the city’s 
position in the global knowledge-based economy by attracting members 
of what Florida calls “the creative class.”103  As Florida’s famous “gay-
Bohemian” index demonstrates, there is a close correlation between 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. See, e.g., Furuseth et al., supra note 14, at 2-4. 
 100. See, e.g., Tyrel G. Moore & Gerald L. Ingalls, A Place for Old Mills in a New 
Economy: Textile Mill Reuse in Charlotte, in CHARLOTTE, NC: GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF A 
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(Apr. 7, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://observer.com/2016/04/de-blasio-rips-trans-pacific-partner
ship-calls-nafta-a-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/8MAB-K25T]. See generally Binyamin 
Appelbaum, Simmering for Decades, Anger About Trade Boils Over in ‘16 Election, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/business/economy/trade-don
ald-trump-bernie-sanders.html [https://perma.cc/C5KV-DY6C] (explaining the complex 
politics of trade and the TPP); Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Supporters Pin 
Hopes on Lame-Duck Vote, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
02/business/trans-pacific-partnership-supporters-pin-hopes-on-lame-duck-vote.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ZHH-ZEL6]. 
 102. See Steve Harrison, New Sanctuary City Law Could Force Charlotte to Change 
Civil Rights Resolution, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Oct. 29, 2015, 6:14 PM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article41857026.html [https://perma.cc/6PZ5-
8H6G]; see also Amber Tong, What Exactly Is a Sanctuary City?, GOVERNING (July 29, 
2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-sanctuary-city-congress-
georgia-north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/8C8N-JSUN] (describing some examples of 
sanctuary cities). 
 103. See generally FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 93, at 283-
314. 
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cities with concentrations of gays and artists, and higher incomes and 
housing prices.  Florida theorizes that this is so because communities 
that are friendly towards bohemians and gays are more likely to be open 
to talented people “across racial, ethnic and other lines,” that creative 
people are more likely to be attracted to communities with inclusive 
cultures, and that historically marginalized groups like artists and gays 
are more likely to themselves be involved in the innovative and creative 
work that the knowledge-based economy values.104  Indeed, in a recent 
interview, Charlotte mayor Jennifer Roberts explained, citing Florida’s 
work, that one motivation behind the city’s decision to extend civil rights 
protections to gays and transgender individuals was the desire to boost 
the city’s economy by bringing in more creative people.105 
Republican state legislators, who answer almost exclusively to rural 
residents, are motivated to enact policies that reflect their rural 
constituents’ hostility towards globalization.  Preempting local laws 
designed to enhance cities’ position in a global economy is a natural 
expression of this underlying hostility.  North Carolina’s HB2, of course, 
preempted Charlotte’s effort to provide civil rights protections for 
transgender individuals as well as all other local civil rights and workplace 
protection laws, and the state also preempted all local sanctuary city 
policies after Charlotte announced its intention to adopt such policies.106  
Many other states have similarly blocked local immigration, civil rights, 
and workplace regulations (including living wage laws).107  In effect, if not 
intent, these laws make it harder for cities to succeed in a global economy 
that rewards diversity and a liberal approach to immigration.  Charlotte has 
already felt some of the adverse impacts of these preemption efforts, as, in 
light of HB2, the electronic payment service PayPal recently cancelled 
plans to build a facility in Charlotte, the National Basketball Association 
moved the annual All-Star Game from the city, and several performers 
cancelled concerts in the state.108  State legislators, though, have little 
                                                                                                                                         
 104. See FLORIDA, WHO’S YOUR CITY, supra note 88, at 135-39. 
 105. See Ronald Brownstein, ‘Just Let Charlotte Be Charlotte,’ ATLANTIC (Jun. 17, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/just-let-charlotte-be-charlotte/48
7499/ [https://perma.cc/3W9T-76ZV] (transcribing interview with Charlotte mayor Jennifer 
Roberts); Ronald Brownstein, The Twin Challenges Facing Charlotte, ATLANTIC (Jun. 16, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/charlottes-web/487256/ [https://
perma.cc/S5DH-4DXB] (noting that Charlotte’s immigration and civil rights policies are 
intended to create an inclusive environment that will attract young, well-educated 
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 106. See Harrison, supra note 102; Tong, supra note 102 (noting that North Carolina has 
some of the strictest laws against sanctuary cities). 
 107. See Tong, supra note 102 (on immigration). 
 108. See Jennifer Bendery, HB2 Just Cost North Carolina Another $250 Million, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2016, 6:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/pat-mcc
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disincentive to take actions that harm cities because, in today’s global 
economy, cities are already so completely disconnected from rural areas 
that an urban economic downturn is unlikely to have ripple effects on the 
places Republicans care about.  In fact, in a political environment divided 
between apparent “winners” and “losers,” a city’s economic loss can easily 
be presented as a win for declining rural areas.109 
Republican attitudes with regard to trade are complex, but it is notable 
that Donald Trump won the Presidency in part due to his hardline 
opposition to free trade and immigration, despite renouncing Republican 
orthodoxy on many other issues.  Trump’s message resonated primarily in 
economically declining, rural areas of the country, where most of his 
support was concentrated.110  His campaign, epitomized by his “Make 
America Great Again” slogan, was driven by supporters’ sense that they 
were “losers” under globalization.111  A recent survey shows that 
Republican attitudes toward trade have made a dramatic negative turn over 
the last ten years—in 2006, forty-three percent of Republicans had positive 
attitudes toward trade compared to twenty-seven percent with negative 
attitudes; today, forty-seven percent view trade negatively and only 
eighteen percent view it positively.112  Indeed, there is increasing 
speculation that globalization may be sparking a partisan realignment, with 
Democrats becoming the pro-globalization party and Republicans the anti-
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globalization, nationalist party.113  This move would track similar trends 
elsewhere in the world.  Anti-immigrant and anti-trade nationalist political 
parties are gaining strength across Europe, driven by fears that 
globalization and immigration are weakening national identity.114  
Concerns about immigration and global economic integration were also 
behind the successful campaign for Britain to withdraw from the European 
Union.115  It should come as no surprise that support for Britain leaving the 
European Union, as well as for nationalist political parties elsewhere in 
Europe, has been strongest in depopulating, declining rural and industrial 
areas outside urban centers and weakest within growing cities.116 
D. The Cultural Costs of Globalization 
The rising anxiety about immigration and global integration indicates 
that globalization’s economic changes are increasingly entwined with 
cultural changes, and these cultural changes have similarly increased the 
social and political divide between urban and rural areas.  By enabling and 
incentivizing mobility, globalization has intensified the geographic self-
sorting of populations by both socio-economic status and cultural attitudes 
towards government and diversity.  Intentionally or not, people are 
gravitating toward communities in which most of their neighbors share 
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brexit.html [https://perma.cc/YW6J-RQZR] (noting connections between the Brexit 
campaign and the rise of Trump). 
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Real Problems Are Deeper, VOX (June 20, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/6/
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Austria’s recent presidential election, the far right nationalist candidate Norbert Hofer 
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their own political and cultural perspectives.117  At the same time, because 
cities are no longer economically linked with adjacent rural areas, city and 
rural dwellers rarely have any reason for contact with one another, and no 
longer see their fates as linked together in any significant way.118  The 
evolution of distinct and mutually exclusive political cultures is magnified 
by the rise of the internet and twenty-four hour cable news networks that 
enable people with distinct cultural and political preferences to receive 
their news and entertainment from entirely distinct sources that expressly 
cater to those preferences.119 
Moreover, the sorting process itself hardens the cultural boundaries 
between rural and urban dwellers.  The population mobility that 
globalization enables is almost entirely one way—from rural to urban 
areas.120  Between 2010 and 2014, rural areas lost an average of 33,000 
people per year, a period during which cities gained as many as 2.3 million 
people per year.121  City dwellers have become accustomed to constant 
change, disruptive innovation, and swelling diversity, which yields more 
liberal and accommodating attitudes, while rural areas have become 
insulated against cultural change and diversity, resulting in a more 
conservative perspective.122  In the absence of any economic or cultural 
interchange between the two regions, each sees the other as morally corrupt 
or backward.123 
As before, this cultural divide between urban and rural areas leads to an 
increasingly zero-sum political contest.  Since the 1960s, Democrats have 
pursued a deliberate strategy to concentrate their resources on urban voters, 
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while Republicans have appealed to white voters disaffected by cultural 
and racial change and disenchanted by liberal urban values.124  That trend 
reached its apotheosis during the 2016 presidential election, as Donald 
Trump ran a campaign that, despite his status as a lifelong New Yorker, 
was anti-urban to its core.125  On the other hand, Democratic presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton’s campaign paid more attention to issues of 
concern to urban voters.126 
The social and geographic distance between urban and rural areas has 
caused cultural conflict to become increasingly uncompromising, with each 
side seeing issues related to race, gay marriage, gun control, abortion, and 
civil rights for transgender individuals as, once again, zero-sum contests in 
which either urban or rural culture will decisively win out over the other.  
One example is the debate over the “Black Lives Matter” movement, which 
both sides of the 2016 presidential campaign exploited to mobilize 
voters.127  Though the phrase and the larger movement grew out of several 
controversial police killings of unarmed black men and were aimed at 
establishing the seemingly uncontroversial proposition that black lives 
should be accorded the same value as white lives, the phrase was attacked 
as racist for the supposed implication that “only black lives matter.”128  The 
leap from “Black Lives Matter” to the inference that “only black lives 
matter” reflects a zero-sum racial logic—emphasizing the value of black 
lives somehow devalues other lives.  On the other hand, there have been 
several troubling incidents on university campuses of left-leaning groups 
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attempting to prevent the airing of views that dissent from a supposed 
moral consensus, on the grounds that these views are not only clearly 
wrong, but are so offensive that mere exposure to them would inflict harm 
on students.129  On both sides of the debate, there is the sense that any gains 
one moral culture achieves must come at the expense of the alternative 
moral culture.  Because, in our age of geographic self-sorting and a 
globally networked urban economy, people so rarely come into contact 
with those who have different views or lifestyles, it becomes all too easy to 
demonize the “other” and avoid any kind of compromise or debate. 
E. Fight over the Franchise 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of how uncompromising the political 
struggle between urban and rural areas has become is that both sides have 
given up attempting to persuade the other and have instead devoted their 
resources to achieving victory through demography.  The last few years 
have witnessed a flurry of new voting rules in Republican-controlled states, 
usually enacted on a strict-party line vote, that make voting harder for 
likely Democrats.  The new rules limit early, absentee, and mail-in voting, 
require voter registration prior to Election Day, purge voter rolls of 
individuals who are suspected of being ineligible, and impose strict 
requirements that certain forms of identification be provided as a 
prerequisite to voting.130  Though styled as efforts to attack voter fraud, 
these new rules appear intended to depress turnout by likely Democratic 
voters, especially the poor and African Americans.131  North Carolina 
adopted perhaps the strictest set of voter restrictions in the country, 
eliminating same-day registration, reducing the early voting period, 
                                                                                                                                         
 129. See, e.g., Zachary Benjamin and Michael Qian, Campus Reacts to Blue Lives Matter 
Display Replaced by #BlackLivesMatter Posters, DARTMOUTH (May 13, 2016, 7:14 AM), 
http://www.thedartmouth.com/article/2016/05/display-removed-in-collis-replaced-with-
blacklivesmatter-posters [https://perma.cc/K56X-D42E] (describing one incident of student 
silencing on moral grounds at Dartmouth College). 
 130. For a survey of some of the restrictions recently adopted in Republican-controlled 
states, see Ryan P. Haygood, Hurricane Scotus: The Hubris of Striking Our Democracy’s 
Discrimination Checkpoint in Shelby County and the Resulting Thunderstorm Assault on 
Voting Rights, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S11, S35-S49 (2016).  As Haygood notes, the 
recent wave of new voting rules began shortly after the Supreme Court’s controversial 
decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  Shelby County struck down a 
part of the Voting Rights Act that required many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, to 
seek “pre-clearance” from the United States Justice Department before making any 
alterations to their voting rules. See id.  Many of the new voting rules adopted after Shelby 
County have been challenged in court under various provisions of federal law, and the 
results so far have been mixed. See id. 
 131. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (2016) 
(describing North Carolina Voter ID law as targeting African Americans “with almost 
surgical precision”). 
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enacting stringent identification requirements, and making the casting of 
provisional ballots more difficult.132  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently struck down North Carolina’s law as an intentional effort to keep 
black voters from the polls in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.133  Challenges to voter ID laws in other Republican states have had 
mixed success in the courts.134 
As Republicans have moved to shrink the pool of urban Democratic 
voters, Democrats have responded by attempting to expand the pool.  For 
example, Democratic Governor Terry McAulliffe of Virginia recently 
issued an executive order (thereby circumventing a vote in the Republican-
controlled legislature) enfranchising thousands of convicted felons, many 
of whom are likely to be Democrats.135  The order could have huge 
political implications in a state that, like neighboring North Carolina, is 
closely divided between urban Democrats and rural Republicans.  
Democrats have also sought to expand the Democratic voter base by 
pushing statehood for the District of Columbia.136  The state would be 
solidly Democratic and, as the only city-state in the union, increase the 
strength of the urban alliance in Congress (for that very reason, 
Republicans oppose the campaign).137  As this discussion makes clear, both 
                                                                                                                                         
 132. See Haygood, supra note 130 at S37. 
 133. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 214. 
 134. Compare Veasey v. Perry, 29 F. Supp. 3d 896 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (invalidating voter 
ID law because disproportional effects of law were related to past intentional discrimination, 
but noting that disparate impact alone is not enough to invalidate voter ID law), with Frank 
v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding Wisconsin voter ID law despite 
disparate impact on Latinos and African Americans). 
 135. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Erik Eckholm, Virginia Governor Restores Voting 
Rights to Felons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
04/23/us/governor-terry-mcauliffe-virginia-voting-rights-convicted-felons.html 
[https://perma.cc/3HUB-BWZA].  McAuliffe’s order was reversed by the Virginia Supreme 
Court, which held he could not order a blanket clemency for all convicted felons, so 
McAuliffe has stated his intent to sign individualized orders for the thousands of 
disenfranchised Virginians. See David A. Graham, Terry McAuliffe’s Second Try at 
Restoring Felon Voting Rights, ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/08/virginia-felon-disenfranchisement-mcauliffe/496898/ 
[https://perma.cc/3R5U-HKYT].  On the rural/urban politics of Virginia, see Ronald 
Brownstein, Why Cities Love Tim Kaine, ATLANTIC (July 27, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2016/07/tim-kaine-metropolitan-model/493238 
[https://perma.cc/6V35-PL2F]. 
 136. See Hillary Clinton, Hillary Clinton: Restoring Faith in Democracy, WASH. 
INFORMER (May 11, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://washingtoninformer.com/news/2016/may/11/
hillary-clinton-restoring-faith-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/2E7B-ZEDV] (referencing both 
McAuliffe’s executive order and North Carolina’s restrictive voter identification law). 
 137. See Perry Stein, Kasich on D.C. Voting Rights: ‘That’s Just More Votes for the 
Democratic Party.,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/local/wp/2016/04/21/kasich-on-d-c-voting-rights-thats-just-more-votes-in-the-
democratic-party/ [https://perma.cc/A4CZ-LKF2] (transcribing interview with then-
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parties have largely abandoned their appeal to the once-exalted “swing 
voters,” and focused instead on mobilizing the voters who are already loyal 
to their party.138 
F. Reasons for Optimism 
In light of the foregoing observations, the assumption of liberal 
democracy that group affiliations are temporary, fleeting coalitions looks to 
be untenable.  The rural/urban political divide appears to be a lasting one, 
and there are few obvious ways to bridge that divide.  There may, however, 
be reason to hope that this will change in the future.  Urban dwellers may 
become more skeptical of government as they see that private individuals 
can coordinate their conduct through sharing and crowd sourcing without 
government oversight, as housing costs rise due to onerous land use 
regulations, and as cities continue to struggle to manage their finances and 
provide basic services.139  Minority communities displaced by 
gentrification as the “creative class” bids up housing prices in cities may 
ask whether they too have become losers under globalization.140  
Meanwhile, as white rural communities struggle with a burgeoning heroin 
                                                                                                                                         
Republican presidential candidate and Ohio Governor John Kasich, who stated one reason 
for opposing D.C. statehood as “that’s just more votes in the Democratic Party”). 
 138. See BISHOP, supra note 9, at 250-75 (observing that Republican President George 
W. Bush defeated Democratic challenger John Kerry in 2004 in part because Bush 
understood that voters were polarized politically and focused on mobilizing Republicans, 
whereas Kerry focused on persuading shrinking number of swing voters). 
 139. See Edward L. Glaeser, The GOP and the City, CITY J. (Winter 2013), 
http://www.city-journal.org/html/gop-and-city-13527.html [https://perma.cc/XR5Y-L2ES] 
(arguing that cities could benefit from free-market thinking on school choice, transportation, 
land use, provision of municipal services, and other areas).  On the difficulties of regulating 
the sharing economy, see Nestor Davidson & John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an 
Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016), and Kellen Zale, Sharing 
Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501 (2016).  As an extreme example of the fallout from a 
city’s financial mismanagement, in the fall of 2015 the city of Chicago adopted the largest 
property tax increase in the city’s modern history, which all went to pay down the city’s 
existing pension obligations. See Hal Dardick, 2016 Brings Tax Hikes for Chicago, Cook 
County, City Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 31, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-new-taxes-fees-20151231-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/GE4A-CY88]. 
 140. See Gillian B. White, The Downside of Durham’s Rebirth, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/03/the-downside-of-durhams-rebir
th/476277/ [https://perma.cc/TMB2-FSWP] (detailing Durham’s struggles with growth, 
gentrification, rising housing costs and pricing out existing residents); see also Aaron M. 
Renn, Trump’s Pitch to Blacks, CITY J. (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.city-journal.org/html/
trumps-pitch-blacks-14695.html [https://perma.cc/VE99-CA7Q] (arguing that urban blacks 
have been harmed more than any other group by mass immigration). 
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epidemic, they may join with urban dwellers to reject the harsh tactics of 
the drug war.141 
Likewise, the politics of globalization are not, or at least not yet, a neat 
urban/rural division.  For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership was 
supported by former President Obama, several big-city mayors, and many 
Republican members of Congress, but opposed by other big-city mayors, 
many Democratic members of Congress, and both the Democratic and 
Republican presidential candidates in 2016.142  This unusual alignment 
demonstrates that the costs and benefits of globalization do not break down 
cleanly along urban/rural lines.  If globalization has been a net harm for 
rural areas, it has hardly been an unvarnished boon for urban areas.  
Globalization has contributed to a widening economic inequality within as 
well as between cities, and the threat of global climate change and 
international terrorism is probably most acute in cities.143  Cities have 
attempted to mitigate many of these impacts through affordable housing 
legislation, minimum wage and other workplace rules, financial 
regulations, and enactments aimed at climate change.144  Although, as we 
have seen, many state preemption efforts today are motivated by a backlash 
against globalization, the reality is that state legislatures are not immune to 
the pressures of a transnational economy, despite their accountability to 
rural residents who are wary of globalization.  One signature characteristic 
of globalization is the mobility of business firms, so states must be wary of 
taking actions that might spark disinvestment.  By preempting local 
business regulations, state legislatures are deferring to global industry 
leaders who demand uniform statewide commercial regulation.  For 
instance, in Republican-controlled Georgia, Governor Nathan Deal vetoed 
the state’s equivalent of North Carolina’s “bathroom bill” after facing 
intense pressure from mobile business interests like the National Football 
League, which threatened to pass over Atlanta for future Super Bowls.145   
While the discussion above provides some reason to hope that the 
current polarized political environment may not be permanent, there are 
unfortunately just as many reasons to fear that it will be.  Unlike Georgia, 
                                                                                                                                         
 141. See MANN, supra note 23, at 130, 185 (describing drug epidemic in rural areas as 
“so devastating that drug experts compare it to the urban crack explosion of the late 1980s”). 
 142. On the complex politics of trade and the TPP, see Appelbaum, supra note 101, and 
Calmes, supra note 101. 
 143. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 179-86, 
252-53 (noting several impacts of globalization upon cities). 
 144. See id. at 179-86. 
 145. See Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious Freedom Bill 
Criticized as Anti-Gay, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2016/03/28/georgia-governor-to-veto-religious-freedom-bill-criticized-
as-anti-gay [https://perma.cc/P332-4KTA]. 
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North Carolina went through with its bathroom bill despite the severe 
economic consequences, perhaps because legislators saw that those 
consequences would largely be concentrated in the very cities that opposed 
the bill.  Indeed, Charlotte itself has borne the brunt of the backlash against 
HB2, as several rock singers cancelled concerts scheduled in the city and, 
as mentioned before, employers like PayPal and the NBA All-Star game 
withdrew their plans for the city.146  Reflecting the zero-sum nature of state 
politics, Republican state legislators might well have figured that HB2 
would only help their standing with rural constituents if the law proved 
harmful to Charlotte.  Although the state did repeal some of HB2’s 
provisions, it did so only because it was threatened with losing the one 
thing urban and rural dwellers both care about – college basketball.147  The 
bruising preemption battles between cities and states nationwide, as well as 
the scorched-earth nature of the 2016 presidential campaign, reveal that 
urban and rural dwellers have not only different interests, but profoundly 
disparate and deeply opposed worldviews.148  On balance, while 
globalization may confound partisan realignment, it does not look likely to 
resolve the widening cultural, economic, and political chasm between 
urban and rural residents. 
III.  THE FAILED PROMISE OF INTRASTATE FEDERALISM 
A. Federalism and Madisonian Democracy 
If it is true that rural and urban voters now represent two permanently 
warring classes, then the “Madisonian” vision of liberal democracy does 
not adequately describe our republic.  Instead of shifting coalitions along 
multiple lines, we now have a society divided firmly into two camps along 
the single line of partisanship.  In place of the belief that there can be 
mutual gains in politics—that today’s minority may be tomorrow’s 
majority—there is now the widely shared belief that politics is zero-sum, 
that one group gains only at the expense of another, and that every loss will 
prove apocalyptic.  Dahl warns that “[t]here are no cases in which a 
democracy has managed to settle conflicts of this kind peacefully.”149 
Fortunately, perhaps, the Madisonian view of liberal democracy is only 
one strand in our political tradition.  There is a competing strand (with 
which Madison himself sometimes agreed) that frankly recognizes the 
durability of group conflict in our society and tries to mitigate it 
structurally.  This strand is federalism.  Under the federal structure of our 
                                                                                                                                         
 146. See Gordon et al., supra note 5. 
 147. See Jarvis, et al., supra note 6 (explaining that state repealed part of HB2 due to 
concerns that NCAA would refuse to host college basketball championships there). 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 144-45. 
 149. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 68, at 277. 
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Constitution, states are considered neither arbitrary collections of 
individuals nor fleeting coalitions, but permanent sovereign entities that 
enjoy direct representation of their collective interests at the national level, 
and autonomy over their internal affairs.  While federalism today serves 
many purposes,150 its original and perhaps abiding goal is to provide a 
mechanism for recognizing group rights and mediating tensions between 
competing groups within the framework of the nation-state.151  The framers 
of our Constitution were generally less concerned with individual rights 
than with the rights of states against intrusion by the national 
government.152  Accordingly, our Constitution recognizes states’ group 
interests in two distinct ways.  First, it provides direct representation for 
states in the national government, most significantly through the Senate,153 
and second, it limits the scope of national power in order to maximize 
states’ autonomy to act with respect to their own internal affairs.154  As 
Will Kymlicka argues, this combination of group-based representation and 
group self-government is a particularly effective means of ensuring group 
rights within a federal structure.  Group-based representation enables the 
group to integrate into the wider society on its own terms, whereas group 
self-government gives the group a measure of freedom from the wider 
society.155 
A robust federalism, then, offers a potential solution to the rural/urban 
divide embodied in the preemption conundrum.  As it happens, most states 
do practice a version of federalism that provides representation for urban 
and rural areas and limited autonomy for local government, often including 
some immunity from state preemption.  Ironically, however, as the 
remainder of this Part shows, the unprincipled way in which federalism has 
been implemented in most states has actually worsened the rural/urban 
divide.  The deepening preemption conflict is one manifestation of this 
problem. 
                                                                                                                                         
 150. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 34-67 (2011) (reviewing 
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 151. See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and 
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B. Intrastate Federalism 
While at the time of the Constitution’s framing and for many decades 
thereafter the predominant line of political cleavage was between northern 
and southern states, today the major cleavage is between urban and rural 
areas within states.156  The difficulty this raises is that federalism does not 
exist at the intrastate level in the same way that it does at the national level.  
Local governments, for example, have never been perceived as sovereign 
in the way states are.  It has long been established that local governments 
are mere creatures of the state with no inherent power and no immunity 
from interference by their “parent” state.157  Furthermore, states cannot 
provide distinctive representation for groups at the state level by, for 
example, giving cities or counties designated legislators because states are 
required to apportion votes for the legislature in accordance with the 
principle of “one person, one vote.”158  As a result, sub-state groups have 
neither autonomy nor direct representation. 
Nevertheless, states have attempted to circumvent this problem by 
creating a quasi-federal structure in which rural and urban areas have both 
direct representation and committed authority over matters affecting 
themselves.  States have provided some degree of direct representation by 
requiring the election of legislators through geographic districts, and they 
have provided a measure of committed authority by giving local 
governments home rule.  The following two sections describe these 
complementary aspects of “intrastate federalism.”  The combination of 
legislative districting and local home rule does not create a true federal 
structure, but has perhaps come close enough most of the time.  However, 
as I conclude, the political realignment and resultant preemption trend we 
are witnessing today demonstrate that this quasi-federal structure is 
                                                                                                                                         
 156. See McKee, supra note 77, at 101-02 (political conflict between rural northern 
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Republicans and urban Democrats). 
 157. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (“Municipal 
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insufficient to mitigate the rural/urban conflict, and may in fact be making 
it worse. 
1. Legislative Districting 
To begin with districting, the constitutionally mandated “one person, one 
vote” rule prohibits states from providing direct representation for urban or 
rural groups of voters.  Prior to Baker v. Carr159 and Reynolds v. Sims,160 
states routinely provided such group-based representation by apportioning 
legislators so that less populous rural areas had disproportionate voting 
power, in order to ensure that rural interests were not drowned out by the 
emerging urban majority.161  In Reynolds, however, the Court held this 
system to be unconstitutional and required that all votes be weighted 
equally regardless of geography.162  In fact, one central purpose of the one 
person, one vote rule was to prevent states from weighting rural interests 
more heavily than urban interests.163  Though dissenters in the early one 
person, one vote cases argued that “[r]epresentative government is a 
process of accommodating group interests,”164 the majority responded that 
the right to vote is “individual and personal in nature.”165  The Reynolds 
court specifically rejected the notion that local governments were sovereign 
entities that were entitled to direct representation in the state legislature.166 
There is, however, still a way of providing representation for sub-state 
groups that is consistent with the one person, one vote rule, and it is a 
mechanism that has been adopted by every state (as well as the U.S. House 
of Representatives): electing legislators from single-member geographic 
districts rather than “at-large,” in which all of the state’s representatives are 
chosen in a single, statewide election.  Districting may not seem a 
particularly effective mechanism for recognizing groups in light of the one 
person, one vote rule, since the boundaries of districts are constantly 
                                                                                                                                         
 159. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 160. 377 U.S. 533 (1963). 
 161. See JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 52, at 126 (state governments were not 
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adjusted to account for population changes (and to accommodate 
legislators’ desire to gerrymander districts for partisan benefit).  As a result, 
the “group” represented by legislative districts is not a fixed normative or 
territorial entity such as a city, but is in some sense an arbitrary grouping of 
individuals.167 
Nevertheless, legislative districting is at least a partial concession to 
group rights because geographic proximity clearly correlates with shared 
interests and political preferences to some degree.168  This point was 
emphasized by the dissenters in the early one person, one vote cases: “[t]he 
very fact of geographic districting, the constitutional validity of which the 
Court does not question, carries with it an acceptance of the idea of 
legislative representation of regional needs and interests.”169  In the years 
since the early cases, the correlation between geography and group interest 
has only grown stronger.  As Bill Bishop explains, Americans are 
increasingly segregating themselves into geographic enclaves of like-
minded individuals who have similar lifestyles and political affiliations, 
and this self-sorting is one of the drivers of our current era of political 
polarization.170 
Districting enables states to recognize group rights because it gives 
groups a degree of political representation that is, notwithstanding the one 
person, one vote rule, disproportionate to the size of those groups’ 
population.  In the words of one observer, “[d]istricting serves various 
purposes but important among them is giving representation to interests 
which would be submerged by majorities in larger groupings of voters.”171  
Districting is able to circumvent the general principle of majority rule by 
selectively “wasting” votes.  North Carolina, for example, has given its 
rural areas a huge majority in the state legislature, although rural dwellers 
are at best a small majority, and possibly a minority of the state’s actual 
                                                                                                                                         
 167. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case 
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population, by packing urban Democratic voters into districts with huge 
Democratic majorities while spreading rural Republican voters more thinly 
across many districts.  In this instance, the legislature has wasted far more 
Democratic than Republican votes – that is, many of the Democratic votes 
are irrelevant to the outcome of elections because they are cast in 
overwhelmingly Democratic districts, whereas Republican votes are more 
efficiently distributed in places where they actually determine the result.  
The state has deliberately chosen to waste more Democratic than 
Republican votes in order to give disproportionate political power to rural 
Republican voters.172  While the wasting of votes may appear to be a 
deficiency in the districting process, Lani Guinier perceptively observes 
that the whole point of districting is to determine how to distribute wasted 
votes.173  In other words, all districting is essentially gerrymandering.  By 
choosing to waste more urban than rural votes, legislators are thereby 
choosing to give rural areas a voice disproportionate to their numbers.  
Although this strategy is obviously not majoritarian, it is consistent with 
federalism’s goal to provide representation for distinct groups rather than 
treating them as aggregations of individuals to be combined into simple 
majorities. 
2. Local Government and Home Rule 
If districting provides a crude form of group-based representation at the 
state level, local government provides an equally crude form of the second 
feature of federalism: group autonomy.  This is done somewhat differently 
from districting.  Unlike districts, local governments can be created and 
modified without regard to the one person, one vote rule.  In most states, 
local governments may be formed by any group of people who desire to 
incorporate a municipality, and neighboring areas that object to the 
incorporation generally have no right to a say in the matter notwithstanding 
the one person, one vote rule.174  Courts frequently recognize that the one 
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person, one vote rule is inappropriate in the context of municipal boundary 
change because the residents of different communities constitute distinct 
groups with divergent interests.175  As a result, the boundaries of local 
governments are rarely the same as the boundaries of legislative districts, 
and so the “group” represented at the state level by a legislator is not the 
same group exercising autonomy at the local level. 
Once in existence, local governments often enjoy home rule, which 
allows them to enact a wide range of legislation without specific state 
authorization, and even immunity against state preemption.176  The original 
model of home rule, known as “imperio” home rule because it was 
designed to create an “imperium in imperio,” or “a state within a state,” 
attempted to introduce a federal structure into state/local relations akin to 
the relationship between the federal and state government, so that local 
governments would have constitutionally committed authority over certain 
“local” affairs.177  As noted earlier, one of home rule’s specific purposes 
was to reduce state interference in local matters and to give local 
governments a degree of autonomy.178  Courts typically defer widely to 
local enactments, particularly on matters relating to land use or school 
control, on the grounds that such decisions embody the collective will of 
the community.179 
In tandem, districting and home rule can be very effective means of 
recognizing group rights and mitigating conflicts between groups.180  Home 
                                                                                                                                         
is inapplicable to state structuring of local governments because states have “wide 
discretion . . . in forming and allocating governmental tasks to local subdivisions”). 
 175. See Lockport, 430 U.S. at 268-72 (holding that the state of New York could 
constitutionally weigh votes of city and non-city voters in a referendum on county 
restructuring differently because city and non-city voters have “distinctive interests” in 
restructuring); Bd. of Supervisors, 838 P.2d at 1200 (“[C]ommunity residents and 
landowners often prefer to govern their local affairs insofar as possible, and cityhood 
provides them with greater opportunities for self-determination than does residence or 
ownership in a more amorphous unincorporated area.”). 
 176. On home rule, see, for example, Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337 (2009), and 
Barron, supra note 55, at 2347. 
 177. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 203-05 
(noting parallels between early “imperio” model of home rule and national/state relationship 
under Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. 
 179. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 939, 947-49; 997-99 (2013) (discussing judicial deference to local land use 
decisions with spillover impacts); Kenneth A. Stahl, Reliance in Land Use Law, 2013 BYU 
L. REV. 949, 982-87, 1016-17 (2013). 
 180. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism–Voting Rights as an American Nationalities 
Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 84 (1995) (describing Voting Rights Act as recognizing 
“geographic and political separation” between groups); Guinier, supra note 167, at 1627 
(arguing that race-conscious districting becomes necessary when racial divisions are 
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rule allows each group to create policies tailored to its specific needs 
without affecting neighboring communities who may have different needs 
or demands.  To the extent communities see themselves as distinct moral 
cultures within the state, they can craft local rules that reflect their 
distinctive cultures and avoid conflicts between competing cultures that 
could arise if there were a uniform statewide standard.181  If home rule thus 
segregates competing groups into semi-autonomous enclaves, legislative 
districting is a means of integrating those groups into a shared political 
culture.182  As Pamela Karlan explains, the size and group dynamics of a 
legislature facilitate the bridging of differences between cultures more 
easily than would be possible among the electorate as a whole.183  In 
sociological terms, home rule provides “bonding” social capital within 
communities, and districting provides “bridging” social capital between 
communities.184 
C. Intrastate Federalism’s Failure 
In principle, intrastate federalism works beautifully.  In practice, it does 
not work at all.  Republican legislatures in states like North Carolina have 
drawn districts not simply to give rural areas a voice for their distinctive 
interests but to give them an insuperable advantage over growing urban 
areas.  Far from mediating conflicts between competing groups, this 
arrangement only deepens such conflicts.  Furthermore, the current rash of 
preemption demonstrates that local governments rarely have any 
meaningful autonomy against the state either.  Through preemption, 
legislators can overturn local laws enacted by urban majorities to reflect 
urban values, and replace them with statewide laws reflecting rural values, 
even though rural voters are at best a small majority, and possibly a 
                                                                                                                                         
permanent, and winner-take-all majoritarianism consistently prevents minority voters from 
being part of winning coalition). 
 181. Cf. Richard Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 183-84 (2003) (arguing that granting cities a sphere of 
“constitutional home rule” in matter of same-sex marriage can give local majorities the 
discretion to adopt more inclusive rules than are mandated at the statewide level without 
requiring courts to mandate a uniform rule regarding marriage, thus showing “respect [for] 
the significant differences of opinion regarding same-sex marriage by allowing such 
opinions to be expressed at the level of community most appropriate [for] their assertion”). 
 182. See Karlan, supra note 180, at 96-97; Kymlicka, supra note 155, at 169-75 
(explaining that providing group representation in a legislative body is a mechanism for 
integrating groups into the larger political order, not segregating them). 
 183. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 215-19 
(1989) (explaining how dynamics of legislatures enable coalition-building among legislators 
much more easily than among the citizenry as a whole). 
 184. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 362, 400 (2000) (discussing “bridging” and “bonding” social capital). 
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minority, of the statewide electorate in many states.  Where there is no 
room for local variation and every battle must be fought at the statewide 
level, it ensures a zero-sum battle in which one side will emerge as the 
winner and the other as the loser.  On the whole, states like North Carolina 
have structured their state politics not to mediate between urban and rural 
interests but to resist the demographic tide of urbanization altogether.185 
The root of the problem is that intrastate federalism is not a true federal 
system, in which subgroups have constitutionally committed power, but a 
unitary system in which state legislatures have ample room to decide how 
much authority to confer upon substate groups.186  Courts have been 
reluctant to permit a meaningful exercise of federalism at the intrastate 
level because of an abiding suspicion of the very idea of group rights, a 
suspicion rooted in the tradition of Madisonian liberalism that fears 
“factions” and prefers that society be ordered around the individual rather 
than groups.187 
To begin with home rule, courts have long resisted seeing local 
governments as deserving of autonomy, and have never treated home rule 
as providing any real federalism.  Though the original “imperio” home rule 
model was supposed to transform the relationship between states and local 
governments into a true federal relationship in which local governments 
had relative autonomy over local affairs, in practice home rule has rarely 
worked this way because the dividing line between local and state affairs is 
extremely amorphous.   On almost every subject of government regulation, 
from land use to health care, from the conditions of employment to civil 
rights, there are equally persuasive arguments that the matter requires 
statewide uniformity and that the matter calls for local experimentation and 
the application of local knowledge.188  As a result, in situations where there 
is a conflict between states and local governments, courts are reluctant to 
compromise states’ police powers and undermine statewide uniformity in 
                                                                                                                                         
 185. See Ehrenhalt, supra note 8 (arguing that wave of preemption in North Carolina 
represents effort by rural-controlled legislature to restore state’s rural past in the face of 
rapid urbanization). 
 186. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 68, at 200-01 
(contrasting “federal” system against “unitary” system). 
 187. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 65, at 1088 (describing liberal tradition’s mistrust of 
groups intermediate between the state and the individual, particularly local governments: 
“[t]he evolution of liberalism thus can be understood as an undermining of the vitality of all 
groups that had held an intermediate position between what we now think of as the sphere of 
the individual and that of the state”). 
 188. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 232 
(“Any argument in favor of statewide uniformity can be met with an equally forceful 
argument on behalf of local diversity, and vice versa.”). 
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the interest of local self-government.189  Moreover, many states have 
adopted a form of home rule that gives local governments no immunity 
against state interference, and a handful of others, like North Carolina, do 
not offer their local governments home rule at all.190  States without home 
rule are subject to “Dillon’s Rule;” local governments are completely 
subservient to the state and have only those powers specifically delegated 
to them by the state.191  Thus, in most states, including and perhaps 
especially in North Carolina, local governments have little power to block 
explicit state preemption whether they have home rule or not.192 
With regard to districting, courts have tolerated the practice, even when 
used to gerrymander districts for partisan advantage, because they do not 
see districts as groups at all, but only as arbitrary collections of individuals 
who freely shift their allegiances in true Madisonian fashion.  In Davis v. 
Bandemer, for example, the Court addressed the question of whether 
gerrymandering a legislative district for partisan advantage could violate 
the equal protection clause.193  The dissent would have found an equal 
protection violation, arguing that “[t]he concept of representation 
necessarily applies to groups,” and therefore that members of the losing 
party in a gerrymandered district suffer harm as a group because they can 
expect to have less influence with their representative than members of the 
winning party.194  However, a plurality of the Court answered that even if 
the minority party “loses election after election,”195 its members would 
                                                                                                                                         
 189. See Barron, supra note 55, at 2347-48 (noting that courts may be reluctant to 
broadly construe local governments’ home rule powers because of “a more general judicial 
uneasiness with creative local action and a corresponding preference for uniformity”). 
 190. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 176, app. at 1374-1424 (listing home rule status 
for all fifty states); Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1124-27 
(2007) (discussing different models of home rule). 
 191. See, e.g., DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 
10-11 (2001); Barron, supra note 55, at 2285-88; Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal 
Concept: The Problem of Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1206-11 (2008). 
 192. Some scholars have persuasively argued that where local governments act to protect 
certain constitutional liberties that are incapable of direct judicial enforcement, states may 
be prohibited from preempting them. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: 
Traces of Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Schragger, supra note 181, at 
172.  Arguably, Charlotte’s “bathroom bill” could fall within the sphere of “constitutional 
home rule,” as it may be an effort by the city to enforce the guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to provide equal protection of the law to transgender individuals.  However, 
even if constitutional home rule were explicitly recognized by the courts–which it never has 
been–it would not provide immunity against the vast majority of preemption laws, such as 
those dealing with the minimum wage, fracking, plastic bag bans, nutrition, and the like, 
which do not appear to involve local protections of any constitutional freedoms. 
 193. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 194. See id. at 167, 170 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 195. Id. at 132. 
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have no equal protection claim because the Court generally indulges the 
assumption that the winning candidate adequately represents everyone in 
the district, including those who voted for the losing candidate.196  In an 
often-quoted line, the Court stated that “the power to influence the political 
process is not limited to winning elections.”197  In a subsequent case, Vieth 
v. Jubelirer, a plurality of the Court went even further, finding partisan 
gerrymandering to be a non-justiciable “political question” in part because 
“[p]olitical affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from 
one election to the next; and even within a given election, not all voters 
follow the party line.”198  By contrast, in recent years the Court has become 
especially vigilant in preventing districts from being constructed in such a 
way as to explicitly take account of “immutable” group characteristics like 
race.199 
In summary, neither districting nor home rule provide meaningful 
recognition for group rights.  As a result, state legislatures are free to ignore 
or override group claims, and worse, to manipulate intrastate federalism to 
favor certain groups and disfavor others. 
                                                                                                                                         
 196. A plurality of the Court has subsequently opined that partisan gerrymandering is a 
nonjusticiable political question; thus, it is not even theoretically possible to attack partisan 
gerrymandering as an equal protection violation. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004). 
 197. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132. 
 198. See 541 U.S. 267, 287-88 (holding that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable 
political question and does not violate equal protection clause because the clause 
“guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in government 
to equivalently sized groups”). 
 199. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that the legislature violates the 
equal protection clause where race is the “dominant and controlling rationale” for creating 
electoral districts); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that where district’s shape 
can only be explained by reference to race, it violates equal protection clause); cf. Holder v. 
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905-06 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the 
“assumption that racial groups can be conceived of largely as political interest groups” as 
“repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution”).  The recent 
fate of North Carolina’s egregious gerrymander is a remarkable demonstration of the current 
state of judicial doctrine regarding gerrymandering.  A panel of three federal judges 
invalidated the state’s Senate districting map, not on the grounds that it was impermissible 
partisan gerrymandering, but that it was invalid racial gerrymandering.  The court reached 
this conclusion because the state had attempted to disguise its partisan gerrymander as an 
effort to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by creating safe majority-minority 
districts. See Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016).  The problem, 
in other words, was not that the state had given too little attention to the rights of minority 
groups but that it had given too much.  In the future, states like North Carolina will 
presumably be more forthright in declaring that partisan gerrymandering is their motivation.  
The Covington case may come before the Supreme Court this term. 
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D. Reviving Intrastate Federalism 
The courts’ reluctance to recognize a robust intrastate federalism stems 
from a suspicion of the idea of group rights and a corresponding preference 
for individual rights.  In Vieth and Davis, for example, the Supreme Court 
assumes that districts—unless racially gerrymandered—are agglomerations 
of abstract individuals, that partisan affiliations are fleeting, and that 
political contests are endlessly malleable rather than fixed and zero-sum.200  
As this Article has shown, however, these assumptions no longer hold, if 
they ever did.  It now appears that urban Democrats and rural Republicans 
have become permanent and fixed antagonists, not temporary coalitions, 
and the number of truly persuadable independent voters is declining.201  
Considering that partisans in both camps no longer wish to even socialize 
with each other, it is not plausible to suppose that voters will be convinced 
to change their beliefs or loyalties.  The fact that party leaders on both sides 
have given up the effort to convince voters, and now focus instead on 
motivating their own partisans and suppressing votes from the competing 
party, is strong evidence of that point.202  When courts proceed on the 
assumption that Madisonian democracy is still operative, despite increasing 
evidence that society is composed of competing groups, it leads precisely 
to the political crisis point we have now reached, in which a dominant 
group uses the structure of democratic institutions to preserve its 
dominance.  In this case, that institution is federalism.  Though intended as 
a tool for mediating group conflict, federalism has ironically become yet 
another front within that conflict. 
It follows logically that federalism can only work if it is enshrined in the 
state constitution, and thereby immunized from partisan manipulation.  
Most states placed home rule provisions in their constitutions, committing 
certain functions to state and local authorities respectively, for exactly this 
reason.203  But the failure of home rule to actually provide meaningful 
intrastate federalism should give us some pause before settling on this 
solution.  Imperio home rule failed because there is no rational way to 
discern which matters ought to be handled locally and which by the 
state.204  In the absence of a principled dividing line between state and local 
functions, judges have tended to import their own ideological views about 
the relative merits of centralized or decentralized powers into the resolution 
                                                                                                                                         
 200. See Vieth, 541 U.S. 267; Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 117-29. 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38. 
 203. See KRANE, supra note 191, at 11. 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90. 
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of this question, and they have generally favored centralization.205  
Ultimately, how much power is desirable for localities to exercise vis-à-vis 
the state and when to prefer uniformity over diversity or vice versa is in the 
nature of a political question that is more suitably resolved in the political 
forum than the judicial one.206 
Of course, this conclusion takes us right back to the initial problem, 
which is that the political forum is itself so fractured into competing groups 
that it seems impossible to settle on any kind of policy decision about the 
appropriate place of local governments within the state that will not be 
perceived by one side or the other as a cynical power grab by a transitory 
majority.  This is so because, while courts have erred in treating home rule 
as a justiciable question, they have made exactly the opposite mistake in 
the partisan gerrymandering cases, ruling such claims to be non-justiciable 
political questions.  A persuasive and well-developed theory of judicial 
review holds that courts should most aggressively intervene in the political 
process when there is a failure in the political process that the process itself 
is incapable of correcting.  In a much-quoted passage from his classic book 
Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely explains that such a process failure 
occurs where: 
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that 
they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually 
denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority 
are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or 
a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby 
                                                                                                                                         
 205. See Barron, supra note 55, at 2347 (noting that courts may be reluctant to broadly 
construe local governments’ home rule powers because of “a more general judicial 
uneasiness with creative local actions and a corresponding preference for uniformity”); 
Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 231-35 (providing 
example of courts importing ideological views into home rule dispute). 
 206. See Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50, at 232 
(arguing that home rule could be considered a nonjusticiable political question).  In a recent 
article, Paul Diller argues that state preemption of urban laws is inconsistent with 
democratic norms because urban areas are underrepresented relative to rural areas at the 
state and federal level as a result of intentional and unintentional gerrymandering and other 
factors. See Paul Diller, Re-Orienting Home Rule: Part II–The Promise and Peril of 
‘Constitutional Home Rule,’ 77 LA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with author); see also 
Diller, supra note 190.  He argues that courts should recognize a sphere of “constitutional 
home rule” for cities above a certain size and density that would immunize them against 
some state acts of preemption, as a corrective against this underrepresentation.  See Diller, 
Re-Orienting Home Rule, supra, at 4, 26-34.  Diller is persuasive on many points, and his 
careful analysis is very rewarding.  However, I am skeptical of the argument for 
constitutional home rule because, as stated in the text, courts have had a very unsuccessful 
track record at distinguishing “local” from “statewide” matters. See Stahl, Local Home Rule 
in the Time of Globalization, supra note 50.  Furthermore, as explained below, the courts 
would go a long way toward correcting the urban disadvantage if they were more assertive 
in policing partisan gerrymandering. See infra text accompanying notes 202-12. 
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denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a 
representative system.207 
Partisan gerrymandering in states like North Carolina represents exactly 
the sort of process failure Ely describes.  Gerrymandering closes the 
“channels of political change” by enabling the very representatives who are 
elected as a result of it to perpetuate it, thereby ensuring that the rural “ins” 
stay in and the urban “outs” stay out. 208  This process failure would 
perhaps be little cause for concern if, as the Court often assumes, districts 
were simply agglomerations of abstract individuals with fleeting 
allegiances.  In an era when rural and urban dwellers have sorted 
themselves into competing political camps, however, partisan 
gerrymandering threatens to permanently shut the emerging majority of 
urban voters out of power. 
The process failure created by partisan gerrymandering in turn affects 
the way we think about home rule.  Because partisan gerrymandering 
assures rural Republican control of the statehouse in many places, urban 
Democrats can only wrest such control by relocating power elsewhere, and 
so home rule becomes a kind of code word for partisan politics.  To 
strengthen home rule, in other words, would be to empower Democratic 
cities vis-à-vis Republican legislatures; to weaken it would be to do the 
opposite.  In light of the obvious political implications of home rule, it is 
unlikely that voters and legislators will see the question of local power as 
anything but a partisan issue.209 
To break the Gordian knot and enable the allocation of power between 
states and local governments to be evaluated on its merits would require the 
Court to reconsider the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering.  Several 
gerrymandering cases are indeed pending before the Court at the time of 
                                                                                                                                         
 207. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980). 
 208. Id.; see also Symposium, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The 
Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329 (2005) (describing how process-policing arguments set 
forth in Ely’s work could apply to gerrymandering). 
 209. The obvious political implications of home rule in light of partisan gerrymandering 
make me skeptical of Professor Diller’s proposal to create a sphere of constitutional home 
rule to counteract the urban disadvantage at the state level. See supra note 206.  
Intentionally or not, Diller’s proposal may be read as a tool for empowering Democrats 
against Republicans.  On the other hand, attacking partisan gerrymandering directly would 
not have a similar implication, as a prohibition or limit on partisan gerrymandering would 
apply to all parties.  The root of the disagreement between Diller and myself may be that he 
sees unintentional gerrymandering as a more significant factor than intentional 
gerrymandering in creating the urban disadvantage, whereas I believe the opposite. See 
Diller, Re-Orienting Home Rule, supra note 206, at 50 (“[E]ven neutral redistricting might 
not entirely eliminate the urban disadvantage in first-past-the-post elections so long as 
compact, contiguous districts are used.”).  The empirical evidence on the impact of 
intentional versus unintentional gerrymandering is admittedly mixed. See supra note 28. 
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this writing.210  However, the Court has been reluctant to enter this 
“political thicket,” a reluctance driven largely by its worry that it cannot 
formulate a judicially administrable standard to judge the practice.211  
Perhaps the Court will change its view if it becomes convinced that 
partisan divisions today represent a society irreparably fractured into 
competing groups.212 
CONCLUSION 
Insofar as federalism is intended to accommodate competing groups 
within the nation-state, it is an alternative to a far more drastic solution to 
competing group claims—secession.213 During the early twentieth century, 
a period much like our own during which globalization and an influx of 
immigrants transformed cities and drove a wedge between rural and urban 
voters, urban reformers argued that cities had so outpaced their states and 
become so different from other areas in the state that they should secede.214  
This did not happen, of course, because our political tradition makes 
secession extremely difficult.  As creatures of their parent state, local 
governments cannot secede without permission from the state, and though 
in principle state constitutions sometimes permit areas of a city to secede 
                                                                                                                                         
 210. The Court recently decided one gerrymandering case on technical grounds, see 
Bethune-Hill et al. v. Virginia State Bd. Of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).  For another 
case heard the same day that is still pending, see McCrory v. Harris, No. 15-1262 (North 
Carolina).  See Whitford et al. v. Gill, No. 3:15 cv-00421 (Wisconsin) and Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, No. 2:12-CV-691 (Alabama), for other 
gerrymandering cases likely to be heard by the Court in 2017. 
 211. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287-88 (2004). 
 212. The Whitford case will be particularly interesting to watch because it provides a 
clear standard for judging extreme partisan gerrymandering that may satisfy the Court’s 
desire for a judicially manageable standard.  The three-judge panel in Whitford determined 
that Wisconsin’s state assembly district map represented an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander using a standard developed by several election law scholars called the 
“efficiency gap.” The efficiency gap refers to the difference in the number of wasted votes 
across party lines. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015).  The Whitford court 
found that the efficiency gap between wasted Republican and Democratic votes was 
sufficiently large to make the gerrymander unconstitutional. See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-
CV-421-BBC, 2016 WL 6837229 (W.D. Wisc. Nov. 21, 2016) 
 213. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 657-
58, 664-65 (1991) (explaining that federalism can substitute for secession by providing 
voice for subunits within a federal structure). See generally Erin Ryan, Secession and 
Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist 
Society (May 4, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775377 [https://
perma.cc/LHM3-E5NW] (arguing that federalism is a substitute for secession). 
 214. See Robert C. Brooks, Metropolitan Free Cities, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 222, 230-31 (1915) 
(arguing that secession is necessary to “separate[] unlike social units and permit[] each to 
develop freely in its own way”). 
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from the city, the barriers to secession are usually so high that it very rarely 
occurs in practice.215 
In place of secession, cities were offered home rule.  Federalism was to 
be a substitute for secession.  As we have seen, though, home rule today 
offers cities little protection from exploitation by the state.  In the absence 
of strong home rule, the question must be asked: why shouldn’t cities 
secede?  Urban and rural areas are so radically divided that a single 
citizenship seems at least unreasonably optimistic.  As Cass Sunstein 
argues, secession may be justified where a subunit has reason to believe 
that it will be more economically successful on its own; where it is the 
victim of consistent exploitation by the state; and where it has a distinct 
cultural identity.216  All of these justifications apply to urban areas today. 
Justified or not, the hurdles to secession are high, and rightly so.  
Secession, as Richard Briffault writes, “is a reflection of profound 
pessimism about the capacity of a polity to handle serious internal 
differences democratically and to govern all residents fairly.”217  One of the 
signature characteristics of today’s nation-states is that they accommodate 
within their borders a wide variety of interests and cultures.  The very 
concept of nationality is an “imagined community” of people who are in 
reality radically different but imagine themselves to be part of a single, 
transcendent union.218  This fiction of nationality is a precarious one, 
however, sustained by a very thin tissue of shared history and values.  
Many scholars argue that globalization undermines the very idea of 
nationality, for it creates both supranational and subnational allegiances 
that are far stronger than any attachment to the arbitrary construction of the 
nation-state.219  If every group that felt its ties to the nation-state 
attenuating were able to secede, the state would soon collapse. 
What has been said so far leaves us with three possible resolutions to the 
political impasse preemption epitomizes.  The first is the introduction into 
our state constitutions of a true federal system on the model of our national 
Constitution.  For the reasons above this appears unlikely, and may be 
                                                                                                                                         
 215. For the most famous case of an attempted secession that failed to clear the numerous 
legal hurdles, see Briffault, supra note 53 (regarding Staten Island’s effort to secede from 
New York City in the early 1990s). 
 216. See Sunstein, supra note 213, at 659-61, 664-66. 
 217. See Briffault, supra note 53, at 846. 
 218. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983) (describing the 
nation as an “imagined community” whose members have little organic connection to each 
other but imagine themselves as part of a single community thanks to novels and print 
media creating a sense of shared identity). 
 219. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized (The State of Citizenship 
Symposium), 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 505 (2000) (“[P]eople locate their 
fundamental identities in, and solidarities with, a variety of communities that are neither 
defined nor circumscribed by nation-state boundaries.”). 
2017]PREEMPTION, FEDERALISM & LOCAL DEMOCRACY 179 
unwise.220  Courts are ill-suited to determine what matters are properly 
considered “local” and what “statewide.”  The best the courts can do is to 
clear the channels of political change so that the citizenry can make a 
reasoned judgment about the preferred allocation of power between states 
and local governments.  This outcome may alleviate the immediate 
preemption problem, but it will not resolve the larger rural/urban political 
divide that currently plagues our politics.  The second possibility, then, is 
the further deterioration of the idea of the nation-state, which many 
scholars believe is already underway in this age of globalization.221  Our 
political tradition suggests, however, that while the nation-state may 
become wobbly, our attachment to the status quo and the considerable 
amount of violence that has gone into establishing our current territorial 
boundaries means we are probably stuck with the nation-state for a while 
longer.  That leaves the third possibility, which is that as the battle between 
urban and rural areas intensifies, we will answer by strengthening the myth 
of imagined community, and hoping that myth is sufficient to overcome 
our differences. 
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